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James Thomas Seman 




 For the last several decades, it has been apparent that new methods of identifying 
explosives can help investigators trace their origins. One way to identify an explosive is 
through the use of taggants: materials added to a product that encodes information about 
the product such as when it was manufactured.   
 This research investigates the survivability of a new identification taggant called 
the Nuclear Barcode that overcomes some of the downfalls that have been identified in 
prior taggants.  The Nuclear Barcode encodes information as a unique combination of 
concentrations of rare earths (Ho, Eu, Sm, Lu, and Dy) and precious metals (Ir, Rh, and 
Re) that is then identified using Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA).  The concept of 
“survivability” was tested through a series of experiments on aqueous solutions and post-
blast residues containing three rare earths (Ho, Eu, and Sm). 
 The tests have shown that the three candidate taggant elements can be identified by 
NAA in an aqueous solution at concentrations as low as 100 parts per billion (ppb) with 
uncertainties in the concentration measurement as low as 5 ppb.  These elements can be 
identified in post-blast residue produced by a detonating explosive at higher concentrations 
of 1,000 ppb.  Being able to identify the taggant elements at these concentrations is critical 
for the practical implementation of the Nuclear Barcode, which requires uncertainties 
below 50 ppb.  Five parameters were identified as contributing to the uncertainty and the 
effect of the delay time was investigated.  After a period of 2.5 half-lives, the uncertainty 
in the concentration was found to be higher than the uncertainty immediately afterward, 
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 This research investigated the detectability and measurability of three rare earth 
elements: holmium, samarium, and europium, in post-blast residue by neutron activation 
analysis (NAA).  NAA provides an advantage over chemical techniques in that it detects 
the presence of elements by properties of their nucleus, which is not destroyed during the 
detonation process, as opposed to interatomic bonds that are probed by chemical and 
physical techniques such as infra-red spectroscopy.  The detectability and measurability of 
these three elements was also evaluated when dissolved in aqueous solutions, which serve 
as simulants for undetonated explosives.  Aqueous solutions can stand in for undetonated 
explosives because the major constituents of explosives (carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and 
hydrogen) are effectively inert under NAA due to their low atomic numbers.  Comparing 
these tests allows for understanding of the performance of NAA as a method for measuring 
concentrations of the three rare earth elements in post-blast residue.  This will enable 
further research into additional identification taggants that can be used in explosives. 
 While performing this research, an observation was made about the effect of the 
delay time between irradiating and counting the samples during the process of performing 
NAA.  This observation prompted further experiments that were performed to investigate 
the relationship between the delay time and the measured concentration and its uncertainty, 
which is defined mathematically in Section 2.2.2.  These tests provide information about 
methods of optimizing testing of post-blast residue samples by NAA.  These results provide 
additional information about the performance and suitability of NAA as an analytical 
method for further identification taggant research.    
 
2 
1.1. RESEARCH MOTIVATION FOR AN IDENTIFICATION TAGGANT 
 Terrorist attacks involving explosives have long been a challenge for investigators 
[1, 2].  The use of explosives often destroys items that might be used as evidence, and often 
makes identification of the type of explosive used difficult [3].  Additionally, this type of 
crime has resulted in some of the highest numbers of casualties of any crime, such as the 
bombing of the Edgar Murrah Building in 1995, which killed or injured approximately 850 
people [2].  Developing a technology that provides critical information about the explosive, 
post detonation, could speed up investigations, or provide leads that may not be otherwise 
followed up on by providing novel methods of tracing back to purchase orders or other 
methods of determining the perpetrators. 
 One technology that could be used to provide this type of identification is a taggant.  
A taggant is a foreign material that is added to a product that provides information about 
that material.  A taggant can be a physical object such as a particle, or it can be a chemical 
additive [1, 4].  Taggants can fall under two classifications: detection taggants and 
identification taggants.  As the name suggests, detection taggants are something that is 
added to a material to enhance the detectability of that material.  A common example is the 
small quantity of sulfur containing chemical compounds that are added to natural gas or 
propane at part per million levels.  The addition of these sulfur compounds gives these 
normally odorless hydrocarbons “their” distinctive scent. 
 Identification taggants are the second class of taggants, and the one relevant to this 
dissertation.  An identification taggant is something that is added to a product that provides 
information about that product.  This information could include things like the 
manufacturer, what the material is, or when the material was manufactured.  Identification 
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taggants have been used in several places to encode this type of information to prevent 
theft or counterfeiting of goods such as currency, clothing, or pharmaceuticals [4, 5]. 
 An explosive identification taggant can encode information about the manufacturer, 
the type of explosive, and the batch number of the explosive material.  If that tagged 
explosive is used in a terrorist attack, or in another criminal act, investigators could then 
use the taggant to “read” this information assuming that the taggant survived detonation.  
Knowing this information would then enable the investigation to focus tracing that 
particular batch of explosives.  This could speed up investigations by reducing the amount 
of work, or prevent further attacks if more explosives are discovered to be missing. 
 Identification taggants for explosives are not a new concept.  Federal proposals for 
their inclusion in manufactured explosives were drafted 40 years ago, but were not 
ultimately acted upon [1, 2].  However, studies on introducing identification taggants have 
identified a number of criteria that a successful identification taggant must satisfy: 
survivability, recoverability, utility, compatibility with explosives, safety in manufacture 
and use, no effect on explosive performance or use, compatibility with mined products, 
environmental acceptability, and cost [1, 2].  These criteria are described in Table 1.1.  A 
full discussion of these criteria is available throughout Section 2.  Should an identification 
taggant technology satisfy these criteria, there is a high likelihood that such a technology 
can be practically implemented.   
 Identification taggants have been used in Switzerland since 1980.  All explosives 
produced in Switzerland or imported for use in Switzerland must contain a taggant.  Swiss 
authorities have credited the taggant program with improving the rate at which crimes 
involving explosives were solved. 
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Table 1.1. Successful Explosives Identification Taggant Criteria. adapted from [1, 2]  
Criterion Description 
Survivability  Taggant must not be destroyed (rendered unreadable) by the detonation of the explosive 
Recoverability Taggant must be able to be found in post-blast environment 
Utility Taggant must encode information useful for law enforcement investigations 
Compatibility with Explosives 
Addition of taggant must not cause instability in 
the explosive that makes handling and storing the 
explosive unsafe or effect shelf life 
Safety in manufacture and use Taggant must not pose a health hazard to manufacturers of and users of tagged explosives 
No effect on explosive 
performance 
Taggant must not reduce explosive performance 
nor significantly increase or decrease sensitivity 
of tagged explosive material 
Compatibility with mined products 
Taggant must not contaminate any mined 
resources to the extent that the resource cannot be 
extracted 
Environmental acceptability Taggant must be non-toxic, and non-polluting 
Cost 
Taggant must be cheap relative to the cost of 
explosives and also cheap enough that analyzing 




 In the first 14 years of the taggant program, 44% of crimes involving explosives 
were solved when a taggant was recovered.  Only 16% of crimes involving explosives were 
solved when no taggant was recovered.  In total, a crime where explosives were used was 
2.8 times more likely to be solved when taggants were used [2].  
 
1.2. THE NUCLEAR BARCODE: A NOVEL IDENTIFICATION TAGGANT 
 This dissertation discusses the early development of a new identification taggant 
candidate, called the Nuclear Barcode.  The Nuclear Barcode encodes information about 
the explosives as a unique combination of concentrations of certain rare metals.  In 2014, 
3.1 million metric tons of explosives (including blasting agents such as ANFO) were 
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consumed in the United States [6].  Therefore, the Nuclear Barcode must be able to produce 
a very large number of unique codes.   
 Since several of the metals used in the proposed Nuclear Barcode are expensive, 
very low concentrations of these metals must be used to keep the cost low enough to be 
viable as an identification taggant.  The most expensive metal used is iridium, with a cost 
of $1,200 per troy ounce in 2018.  Concentrations ranging from 100 parts per billion (ppb) 
to 4,000 ppb are proposed, with concentration levels separated by 100 ppb.  This produces, 
for eight taggant elements, a total of 6.56 trillion unique combinations.  To utilize the 
Nuclear Barcode, the concentrations of the taggant elements must be able to be read with 
sufficient precision to place the concentration within one concentration level.  With the 100 
ppb separation between levels, this would require that the measurement technique has a 
precision of 50 ppb.  One such technique, for the elements under consideration, is NAA 
which is described further in Section 2.2. 
 NAA works by bombarding a sample with neutrons.  The nuclei of the atoms in the 
sample occasionally absorb one of these neutrons and convert to a radioactive isotope of 
the same element.  When this radioactive nucleus decays, it emits a number of gamma 
photons at different energies that is characteristic of that particular isotope.  These gamma 
photons can be counted using a detector, and the quantity of the radioactive isotope can be 
determined.  Using this information, it is possible to determine the elemental composition 
of the original sample. 
 Neutron activation analysis provides a similar level of metrological certainty to 
Isotope Dilution Mass Spectroscopy, which is a primary method of measurement according 
to the Comité Consultatif pour la Quantité de Matière — Métrologie en Chimie (CCQM) 
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[7].  Metrological certainty as a principal means that the measured quantity is both 
accurately and precisely determined by the method chosen.  By the CCQM’s definition, a 
primary method of measurement “A primary method of measurement is a method having 
the highest metrological properties [that is, a method that is extremely precise], whose 
operation can be completely described and understood, for which a complete uncertainty 
statement [the uncertainty in the measured quantity is completely determined by the test 
method and any preparation steps, and there is no random component that contributes to 
uncertainty] can be written down in terms of SI units” [7].  The use of primary methods of 
measurement provides certainty that the results are both accurate and precise.  The 
individual elements in the Nuclear Barcode will have different limits of detectability and 
also different levels of uncertainty.  An explanation for these can be found in Section 2.2. 
 Using the nuclear barcode involves several steps.  The first step is creating the 
identification taggant.  For the nuclear barcode, the identification taggant is the unique 
combination of concentration levels of each of the eight elements used.  This taggant is 
added to explosives during manufacturing in such a way that the taggant is well dispersed 
among the final product.  When the explosive is detonated, the taggant elements remain 
behind in the solid phase as post-blast residue, which can be recovered by swabbing 
surfaces that collect post-blast residue with a cotton ball or another sampling implement.  
Finally, post-blast samples are subjected to NAA.  NAA allows the concentrations of the 
taggant elements to be determined and reads the barcode.  This dissertation investigated 




1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 This research focuses on investigating the survivability of the Nuclear Barcode 
concept over other components listed in Table 1.1.  Survivability of the Nuclear Barcode 
is the most important aspect, as without survivability, the other components listed in Table 
1.1 do not matter.  Due to the nature of testing for survivability, as well as the exact method 
of encoding information chosen in the Nuclear Barcode, there is an unavoidable overlap 
between the concept of survivability and the concept of recoverability.  In doing so, the 
concept of survivability was broken down into a series of four objectives, such that if the 
Nuclear Barcode can satisfy these objectives, then it can be considered a survivable 
identification taggant.  The four objectives are: 
 
1. Determine if the taggant elements can be detected and quantified via NAA at the 
desired concentrations. 
 
2. Determine if the different concentration levels of the taggant elements can be 
distinguished via NAA with sufficient precision that the measured concentration 
lies within only one concentration level (50 ppb precision to use the Nuclear 
Barcode as designed). 
 
3. Determine the distinguishability of the taggant elements from background signals, 
including other taggant elements and common elements in the environment such as 




4. Identify concentrations of the taggant elements in the post blast residues and verify 
them to be the same as in the undetonated sample. 
 
 These four objectives address both the qualitative and quantitative use of NAA.  
The qualitative use of NAA allows for the identification of different elements that are 
present in a single sample.  Quantitative use of NAA determines the mass of at least one 
element that is present in the sample.  Both qualitative and quantitative analysis can often 
be performed using the same test data but it is possible in some cases that only qualitative 
data can be obtained.  Of the four objectives listed, only objective three is purely 
qualitative.  Objectives one, two, and four combine both qualitative use of NAA by 
evaluating if the taggant element(s) can be identified and quantitative use of NAA by 
evaluating how much of the taggant element(s) is present in the sample.  A series of eight 
tests was designed based on these four objectives.  These tests were designed to build off 
of one another, while still providing information should the Nuclear Barcode fail a specific 
test.  These tests are extensively described in Sections 4 and 5.  While analyzing the results 
of these tests, five parameters involved in the calculation of the mass of an element by 
NAA were determined to be significant contributors to the results.  Due to this, an 
additional series of tests on one of these, the delay time, was carried out.  The delay time 
is the time between exposing the sample to neutrons and the counting the sample on a 
detector capable of detecting gamma photons.  The five parameters identified by this 





1.4. CONTRIBUTION TO SCIENCE 
 This dissertation discusses the survivability of three rare earth elements: holmium, 
samarium, and europium in post-blast residues produced by explosives using NAA.  This 
research identifies these elements, measures their concentrations, and determines the 
effects of delay time on the uncertainty in their measured concentrations.  Detectability of 
these elements is a crucial component towards the implementation of an identification 
taggant scheme, the Nuclear Barcode, that has been developed based off of this work.  
Detectability of these elements by NAA was found to be dependent on a total of five 
parameters: the neutron flux that the samples are exposed to; the efficiency of the detector 
used; the length of time the sample is irradiated; the length of time the sample is counted; 
and the delay time, the length of time between the irradiation and counting of the sample.  
This last parameter was the most varied during testing due to scheduling needs and safety 
concerns.  These parameters are discussed more fully in Section 2.2 and Section 5.10. 
 Additionally, this dissertation examines the effects of the delay time between 
irradiating and counting the samples on the measured concentration and concentration 
uncertainties in aqueous solutions of holmium when analyzed using NAA.  The delay time 
arises from necessity for some samples, which become too active after irradiation to safely 
handle until enough time passes.  The measurements of the concentrations of holmium and 
the measured concentration uncertainties were compared based on the number of half-lives 
of holmium-166 that elapsed between irradiation and the start of the measurement.  Based 
on these tests, the uncertainty in the measured concentration is minimized by measuring 
the sample before 2.5 half-lives have elapsed.  In real time, this means that samples 
containing holmium should be measured within 67 hours of irradiating, samples containing 
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europium should be measured within 23 hours of irradiating, and samples containing 
samarium should be measured within 115 hours of irradiating.  These results will have 
consequences for optimizing the use of NAA as an analytical method with post-blast 
residues. 
 
1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT 
 This dissertation discusses the history and development of identification taggants 
in Section 2.1.  This discussion is then followed by a review of the literature required to 
understand the foundational technology of NAA in Section 2.2, and a review of the basic 
properties of explosives in Section 2.3.  Section 3 describes the concept of the nuclear 
barcode, an identification taggant that is read by NAA.  Section 4 describes a series of eight 
tests that were performed to evaluate the four research objectives outlined in Section 1.3.  
Section 5 presents the results with an analysis of the tests outlined in Section 4, ultimately 
identifying five parameters important for controlling the uncertainty of NAA.  The effects 
of one of them, the time delay between irradiating a sample and counting it, is presented in 
Section 6.  Section 7 presents a discussion of the consequences of the results shown in 
Sections 5 and 6 and provides a cost estimate of the materials involved in the Nuclear 
Barcode.  Conclusions regarding this research are presented in Section 8, and an overview 
of future work to enable the use of the Nuclear Barcode is presented in Section 9. 
Appendices A and B cover details of the calculation of the concentration of the taggant 
elements identified by NAA and the method by which one parameter was determined  
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respectively.  Appendix C breaks up Figure 5.1, adds additional figures according to 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This section discusses prior research into identification taggants and NAA.  A 
review of identification taggants research is presented in Section 2.1 and describes 
previously developed identification taggants and the circumstances under which they were 
developed.  This review provides the context in which the taggant evaluation criteria in 
Table 1.1 were developed.  Additionally, Section 2.1.3 compares previously developed 
taggants to a key subset of those criteria, foremost of which is survivability.   
 A review of the process of NAA is presented in Section 2.2.  This review describes 
the mechanism by which NAA operates and how this can be used to determine the 
composition of a sample.  Additionally, Section 2.2.2 includes disciplines where NAA is 
used to analyze low concentrations of rare earth elements in a bulk sample, which is the 
same use case that will be presented in Sections 3 through 6.  
 A review of explosives is presented in Section 2.3.  Section 2.3.1 discusses the 
chemistry of detonation and predicts the formation of post-blast residue that remains after 
detonation.  Section 2.3.2 discusses the characterization of explosives as low or high 
explosives; and as primary, secondary, or tertiary explosives.  Section 2.3.3 discusses the 
performance of explosives and identifies key parameters for predicting this performance. 
 
2.1. TAGGANTS LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Regulations governing explosives have often included requirements to provide 
information about the manufacturer, type, and batch of a commercially produced explosive.  
The first method of encoding information about an explosive was simply writing the 
desired information on the explosive’s packaging. Marking explosives in this way can be 
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considered the first identification taggant. Identification taggants that encode this 
information have evolved over the course of over 100 years in the United States.  The 
United States is being used as a general example of how taggant developments have been 
reactive, but developments have also occurred in other countries such as Switzerland.  
Identification taggants are particularly useful as they allow explosives to be tracked back 
to the manufacturer and purchaser.  Correlations can be seen in the evolutional advances 
in identification taggants and events (wars and terrorist activities) that lead to regulations 
governing explosives. The information presented in this section walks through the 
evolution of identification taggants, since 1917, and attempts to identify the corresponding 
event that led to increased regulations governing explosives. The section illustrates that the 
efforts in identification taggants have been primarily reactionary and highlights the need 
for a more proactive approach in taggant research and implementation.  Understanding the 
previously developed identification taggants has led to successive generations of taggant 
candidates.  These taggant candidates each improve on some of the shortcomings of the 
previously developed identification taggants.    
2.1.1. Overview.  Commercial explosives are a valuable resource used in 
industries such as mining and construction. Throughout history, terrorist attacks and 
accidents have demonstrated the potential for misuse of commercial explosive materials to 
cause harm to both people and property [2].  Balancing the economic value of explosives 
while minimizing the destructive risks has been a topic of both scientific interest and 
government policy for over one hundred years in the United States [1, 2].  
 Regulations exist to reduce the misuse of explosives by addressing aspects such as 
the use, transport, and storage of these materials.  These regulations have been historically 
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enacted in response to new external circumstances such as war, increased concerns over 
terrorism, new technology, and new uses for explosives.  This reactive approach means 
that there are inevitable loopholes that can be found by a motivated party that will only be 
closed after an unfortunate event.  Regulations governing explosives have often included 
requirements to provide information about the manufacturer, type, and batch of a 
commercially produced explosive.  Taggants are one technology that has been developed 
to identify explosives.  This section will discuss those developments occurring in the 
United States specifically, but other taggant developments have occurred in other countries 
as well; the United States here is being used as a representative example. 
 There are two categories of taggants used with explosives: detection taggants and 
identification taggants.  Detection taggants are designed to make explosives easier to detect 
and enable a sensor to produce a signal when explosives are present.  One implementation 
of detection taggants is adding volatile chemicals to certain types of plasticized explosives.  
Unlike untagged explosives, bomb-sniffing dogs (for example) can detect these volatile 
chemicals by smell [2].  Additional technologies designed to detect either these volatile 
chemicals or other components of the explosive itself are used in the equipment present at 
airports or government buildings.  Detection taggants and their attendant technologies will 
not be further discussed in this dissertation. Identification taggants provide information 
about the explosive when they are recovered. The key distinction between detection 
taggants and identification taggants is that identification taggants cannot be used until the 
explosive has been located.  Once found, either detonated or undetonated, the identification 
taggant can be read, and the information about the explosive can be retrieved.  This 
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information may contain the manufacturer of the explosive, the type of the explosive, or 
other information such as batch or lot number.   
 Identification taggants are used in many fields such as pharmaceuticals and 
automotive manufacturing to provide information about materials [4].  For example, to 
prove the source or manufacturer of a product to safeguard against counterfeits [5], or for 
tracing materials that are then used to produce unlicensed copies or illegal goods [5].   
 The technology used to create and encode identification taggants has changed over 
time, and many different approaches have been developed such as: small particles, 
biological sensors, radionuclides, and combinations of chemical compounds.  Additionally, 
simply writing information such as the manufacturer or batch on a casing around an 
explosive can be considered an identification taggant, since it encodes information about 
the explosive. Tagging explosives in some way that provides information about the 
explosive has been pursued for more than 100 years [8].  This review shows the progression 
of taggant technology and how it relates to specific events.  Taggant technologies have 
progressed over the course of the 100 years of development and have identified key 
characteristics of a successful taggant.   
2.1.2. Historic Events and Their Relation to Taggant Development.  To have a 
clear understanding and proactive look at the development of new identification taggants, 
it is important to know the history that has shaped explosives regulations and requirements 
for manufacturers over time. A timeline of events and laws passed within the United States 









 From the events and laws shown in Figure 2.1, there have been four eras of 
identification taggant development: the early explosives regulations era, the initial taggants 
era, the updated taggants era, and the modern taggants era.   
 Early explosives regulations (1917-1970).  Identification taggants are 
an additive to an explosive that provides information about the explosive.  The earliest 
method used to provide this information was to encase the explosive in some wrapper that 
had information such as the manufacturer or type of explosive printed on it.  The Explosives 
Act of 1917 standardized requirements for: licensing, manufacturing, storing, and 
distributing explosives and explosive ingredients in the United States upon the nation’s 
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entry into World War 1. One of the main concerns was over the availability of explosives 
for acts of sabotage or “bomb outrages”; acts that would be called terrorism today.  This 
measure was intended to be a temporary one, applying only during the war, and its 
provisions expired in 1919 [8].  An almost identical law, the Federal Explosives Act, was 
passed upon the United States’ entry into World War 2 in 1941, with updated language and 
an updated list of explosive ingredients.  This law, like the 1917 version, also was explicitly 
a wartime measure and expired at the end of World War 2.  The passage of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970 introduced permanent federal regulations for explosives in Title 
IX for the first time.   
 
 Explosives Act of 1917.  Due to the exceptional circumstance of the 
United States entering into World War 1, a uniform set of rules and regulations surrounding 
explosives was deemed necessary [8, 9].  The Explosives Act of 1917 was the first federal 
law passed regulating explosives.  Prior to the passage of this act, explosives regulations 
were left to the states and municipalities. Some states and cities had significant regulations 
on explosives that were used as a template for the regulations coming from this act, while 
other states had no regulations on explosives, and these new regulations were the first to 
apply in these localities [8]. 
 To reduce the possibility of misuse, the Explosives Act of 1917 required users and 
manufacturers of explosives to obtain a license.  This license could only be issued by a 
designated authority and would include information about the licensee and required 
certification that the licensee was a loyal citizen of the United States [8].  Strictly following 
the wording of the Explosives Act of 1917 would require purchasers of approximately 
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1,500 materials, including things such as cotton or starch, to hold an explosives license [8].  
As this would be impractical, the list of materials that would require licensure was reduced 
to oxidizers commonly used in explosives such as ammonium nitrate, as well as 
commercially produced explosives like nitroglycerin [8].  Additionally, sellers of 
explosives were required to verify that purchasers had the proper license and issue receipts 
that contained a description of the intended use for the explosives [8]. 
 The increased burden on law-abiding citizens placed by the Explosives Act of 1917 
was justified, due to the extraordinary circumstances of World War 1 [8, 9].  With the war’s 
end, the law expired, and its provisions were no longer enforced.  The Explosives Act of 
1917 was credited with significant reductions in the availability of explosives for crimes 
or terrorism, as well as, injuries and damage from unintentional detonations caused by 
improper storage [8].  Due to the efficacy of this program, permanently implementing this 
act was discussed to resolve issues stemming from anarchists and other movements that 
were engaging in domestic terrorism [8].  Ultimately, no provision was made to adopt the 
Explosives Act of 1917 as a permanent law. 
 
 Federal Explosives Act (1941).  With the entry of the United States in 
World War 2, the same concerns arose surrounding the use of explosives that were present 
before the passage of the Explosives Act of 1917.  Despite the lack of an official declaration 
of war, the provisions of the Explosives Act of 1917 were revived sometime between the 
beginning of World War Two and the end of 1940 [10].  After declaring war, the Federal 
Explosives Act was passed on December 26, 1941 [11].  This act amended and renamed 
the Explosives Act of 1917 [11].  The amendments were small details such as changing the 
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list of explosives ingredients, not significantly altering the original 1917 act [11].  Notably, 
at the end of the war and thus the expiration of the act, the regulations stayed in place with 
the Federal Explosives Act.  Additionally, the new Federal Explosives Act also 
implemented similar regulations to the ones drafted for the 1917 act, with expanded 
sections on storage and transport [11].  Overall, the changes to the Explosives Act of 1917 
by the Federal Explosives Act were not substantial.  The primary purpose was the same 
with both acts: prevent the use of explosives during wartime by those intending on using 
them against the United States’ government. 
 
 Organized Crime Control Act (1970).  By 1970, there had been  
sufficient change in society to require a more extensive set of regulations outside of a 
formally declared state of war.  The additional requirement of marking explosives with a 
manufacturer, type of explosive, and a date or batch code also shows the change in societal 
opinion of the necessity of explosives regulations.   Domestic bombings by groups such as 
the bombing of the State Department Building in Washington, DC by Weather 
Underground in 1975, as well as other bombings throughout the 1960s and 1970s presented 
new challenges for investigators [12].  In the period between 1917 and 1970, federal 
explosives regulations evolved from an emergency proposal implemented due to the World 
Wars to a fully-fledged regulatory regime recognizable today in the modern Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).  This new regulatory regime stands in 
contrast to the ones created under the original Explosives Act passed in 1917, and the 
refreshed 1941 version.  These two acts created regulations specifically applicable only 
during wartime that: “The operation of this law will doubtless cause inconvenience to 
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persons engaged in legitimate business; it may embarrass worthy citizens in the pursuit of 
their livelihood…” [9].   
 With the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act in 1970, federal explosives 
law continued to evolve.  Title IX of the act permanently enacted updated requirements in 
the same style as the earlier Explosives Act of 1917 and the Federal Explosives Act of 
1941.  The Organized Crime Control Act effected regulations of every aspect of explosives, 
though with less effect on transportation.  It also implemented, for the first time, federal 
explosives regulations while the country was not at war [13].  Many of these regulations 
have been updated in the 48 years since the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act, 
but they all originated from this law [13].  Additionally, the act also gave the ATF federal 
regulatory responsibility for all explosives, where it remains today [13].  
 The Organized Crime Control Act required that all explosives manufactured after 
February 12, 1971, were to bear a label with the manufacturer, type of explosive, and a 
date or batch code [13].  These markings were required to be on the wrappings immediately 
around the explosives (identification taggant), such as a cartridge or bag [13].  Requiring a 
manufacturer label on the packaging of the explosive enables undetonated explosives to be 
identified and tracked with every sale.  However, this method of tagging explosives is 
easily defeated by simply removing the markings or by detonating the explosives, although 
parts of the wrappings may survive, it is unlikely that enough of the identifying information 
will survive to be useful.  Table 2.1 summarizes the different events and reactions prompted 
between 1917 and 1970.    
 Initial taggants (1971-1980).  Manufacturer information included on 
the wrappings, labels, or receipts can be lost by simply removing this labeling, or by 
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Table 2.1. Summary of Events and Reactions between 1917 and 1970 
Event Reaction 
US involvement in 
World War 1 
• Passage of Explosives Act of 1917 – First federal 
regulation governing explosives 
US involvement in 
World War 2 
• Passage of Federal Explosives Act of 1941 
Increased Domestic 
Bombings 
• Passage of Organized Crime Control Act in 1970 




detonation, which will destroy any wrappings around the explosive.  This deficiency was 
recognized almost immediately by the ATF and others in government who began 
investigating better methods in 1972 [14].  In 1974, the Advisory Committee on Explosives 
Tagging, consisting of eleven government agencies and three external groups, was formed 
to investigate methods of implementing identification taggants. A study began in 1976 on 
the most promising candidates run by Aerospace Corporation [14]. 
 In 1978, the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on the bill, ‘S. 2013’, that 
would require the use of identification taggants and detection taggants in explosives 
manufactured for use in the United States [14].  Approximately a year later in 1979, the 
Senate Committee on Government Affairs was considering a separate bill, ‘S. 333’ that 
would impose the same tagging requirements as part of a larger anti-terrorism bill [1].  The 
first bill, under consideration by the Judiciary Committee, held hearings for approximately 
a year and a half that included testimony from many sources, including the ATF and the 
company running the taggant study that had begun in 1976 [14].   The Congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) was enlisted to provide a report, entitled Taggants in 
Explosives to the Committee on Government Affairs, and also used the information gleaned 
from the same taggant study [1].   
 
22 
 The research conducted for the ATF by Aerospace Corporation and reported on in 
Taggants in Explosives was the first large-scale test program developed for identification 
taggants in the United States [1, 14].  As such, an important objective was first to define 
the evaluation criteria for a successful identification taggant.  Five taggant evaluation areas 
were decided upon as the most important areas to determine if a particular taggant method 
would be effective:   
 
1. Taggant recoverability – the ability of the taggant to be collected in the field 
despite the debris and other material present in a post-blast environment.   
 
2. Survivability of the taggant – the ability to read the information encoded 
from the recovered taggant even after being in the explosion.   
 
3. Utility – the amount of additional information the taggant could provide for 
investigations after the taggant was recovered and the information read.   
 
4. Compatibility of the taggant with explosives – any change to the properties 
of the explosive such as its sensitivity, the amount of energy released, 





5. Cost of a taggant program – the cost of the taggant itself, and additional 
costs to manufacturers, sellers, and regulators for tracking the new taggants, 
and any other costs a taggant program might impose [1].   
 
 Three categories of explosives taggants had been developed by the writing of 
Taggants in Explosives in 1980 and could be evaluated using these criteria: radiological, 
chemical, and physical taggants [1]. 
 Radiological taggants were the first category of identification taggant under 
consideration, where one or more radioactive isotopes are added to the explosive to serve 
as an identifier.  Detection of radioactive materials has been well developed, thus allowing 
radiological taggants to be recovered rapidly [1].  Since radiological taggants depend on 
the presence of particular isotopes, they are unchanged during the process of detonation. 
Recovering and reading taggants based on them does, however, require specialized lab 
equipment and procedures unlikely to be available for police work [1].  Radiological 
taggants provide two advantages.  First, there are a large number of available radioactive 
isotopes that can potentially be used, which provides the potential for many unique 
identifiers or including more information [1].  Additionally, radiological taggants emit 
radiation, which enables them to serve as detection taggants as well as identification 
taggants.  While this behavior makes detecting radiological taggants easy, it also poses a 
potential health hazard by exposing people who work with explosives, such as blasters and 
manufacturers, to radiation.  This might also cause additional regulatory costs to 
manufacturers since workers exposed to radiation as part of their job fall under additional 
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regulations [1].  There are also potential issues of public backlash with anything that 
potentially could expose the public to radiation [1]. 
 Chemical taggants were the second category.  One chemical taggant was discussed, 
but not tested, in Taggants in Explosives that was based on combinations of different 
concentrations of ethanol solutions of rare earth salts [1].  This taggant could then be 
recovered from the post-blast residue.  This proposed chemical taggant system relied on 
identifying the rare earth elements and their concentrations, which would survive 
detonation.  Other proposed chemical taggants might not survive detonation due to the 
high-temperature environment created during the detonation process.  This chemical 
taggant provided a sufficient number of unique combinations of rare earth elements and 
concentrations that would provide many potential codes [1].  The reason this taggant was 
not tested was that the ethanol solutions could cause sensitization of the explosives, which 
would make handling more difficult.  Unlike radiological taggants, there was no handheld, 
portable technology developed to detect the presence of a chemical taggant rapidly; so 
complex laboratory analysis would be needed [1].   The identification procedure and 
equipment for reading the identification taggant are complicated and require specialized 
equipment, which increases the cost of reading the taggant, and would not be available for 
forensics work in 1980 [1].  
 Physical taggants were the third category discussed, and the only category to 
undergo significant testing as part of the research conducted by Aerospace Corporation.  
Initially, two physical taggants were to be tested, one developed by 3M Corporation that 
was composed of small particles made from stacked colored layers of plastic, and one 
developed by Westinghouse composed of small ceramic particles doped with fluorescent 
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rare earth compounds.  These particles were small and designed to be introduced in 
relatively large numbers such that removing each of the individual particles would not be 
humanly possible.  Due to concerns over liability, the Westinghouse taggant was not tested 
during this research program [1].  The physical taggant developed by 3M can be both 
recovered and read with simple equipment in the field on a theoretical basis, but it was 
determined that performing both of these tasks in the lab would be necessary in practice.  
In order to read the code, the taggant particles must be separated from the debris present at 
the blast site; these separation procedures were, however, determined to be simple, and can 
be performed with a small amount of training [1].  Testing of the 3M taggant showed that 
a number of particles would survive and be readable using a microscope [1].  The sequence 
of colors in the taggant particle encodes information, and a ten-layer particle with ten 
different colors produces a large number of codes.  Theoretically, only one particle would 
need to be recovered, but increased accuracy could be obtained when additional particles 
were found [1].  The 3M taggant was tested with a range of different commercial explosive 
products and found to be compatible with all but one booster material, and one variety of 
smokeless powder [1].  The cost of tagging an explosive with 0.05% by weight using the 
3M taggant was calculated as being a 2.3% to 23.5% increase depending on the type of 
explosive being considered, with the largest percentage increase coming from detonating 
cord which had the lowest cost basis [1]. 
 The testing performed by Aerospace Corporation and the cost analysis performed 
in Taggants in Explosives show that the 3M physical taggant was a viable identification 
taggant, assuming the few material incompatibilities could be resolved [1].  This made the 
3M taggant a very promising candidate.  In 1978, two bills were under consideration in the 
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United States Senate, though ultimately, neither Senate Bill #2013 nor Senate Bill #333 
became law.  Senate Bill #2013, under consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
raised concerns by the committee members about whether the proposal included black and 
smokeless powders used in ammunition [14].  If these two materials were covered, 
additional concerns over the compatibility and cost were raised [14].  This uncertainty 
appears to have caused discussion on this bill to stop.  Senate bill 333, which prompted the 
writing of Taggants in Explosives, required additional study [1].  As written, the bill would 
involve tagging any explosive material, including blasting agents such as ammonium 
nitrate, as well as black and smokeless powders [1].  The costs of implementing a taggant 
program while covering these materials increased the total program cost to an estimated 
268 million dollars a year in the most comprehensive program [1].  The cost estimate was 
likely the reason for the failure of this second bill.    Table 2.2 summarizes the events that 
occurred between 1971 and 1980, and reactions into investigating identification taggants. 
 Updated taggants (1981-1998).  After the publication of Taggants in 
Explosives, identification taggant research continued in both government and industry [2, 
15].  Taggants in Explosives recommended one of three courses of action: 
 
1. Enact legislation requiring the addition of identification taggants contingent 
on the technical feasibility  
 




3. Take no legislative action and encourage the executive branch to enhance 
alternative methods of investigating taggants [1]. 
 
Table 2.2. Summary of Events and Reactions between 1971 and 1980 
Event Reaction 
Passage of Organized 
Crime Control Act 
(1970) 
• Initial taggants created 
Senate Bill 2013 (1978) • Considered taggant requirements for all explosives 
• Raises concerns over compatibility with taggant in 
black powder and smokeless powder used for sport 
shooting 
Senate Bill 333 (1978) • Considered taggant requirements for all explosives 
• Commissioned Taggants in Explosives 
Taggants In Explosives 
(1980) 
• Identified evaluation criteria for successful 
identification taggant 
• Identified cost, survivability, and compatibility with 
explosives as major areas 




Congress opted to specifically ban appropriations for taggant programs by the ATF from 
1981 to 1993 [2].   
 As a direct result of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma 
City in 1995, also influenced by the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, another reactive 
investigation into the state of identification taggants began [2].  The 1996 Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act required the compilation of a report of the effectiveness 
of taggants for explosives [2].  This report was published by the National Research Council 
in 1998 under the name Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: An Integrated 
National Strategy for Marking, Tagging, Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and 
Their Precursors.  This report henceforth referred to as Marking and Rendering Inert, 
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provided a second comprehensive look at the state of taggant technologies, their utility, 
and the potential for future legislation requiring identification taggants and other 
technologies to guard against explosives [2]. 
 This report defined three types of identification taggants that were developed or 
under development in between the publication of Taggants in Explosives and 1998. The 
first type of identification taggant that Marking and Rendering Inert identified was a 
particulate taggant.  This is another name for a physical taggant and was so named due to 
the fact that the physical taggants developed at the time were mostly small particles [2].  
The second type of identification taggant that was named was an isotopic taggant.  This is 
similar to a chemical taggant where various chemical compounds are added to the material 
to be tagged.  However isotopic taggants also introduce specific isotopes of atoms at some 
of the sites in the chemical compound to encode information [2].  The third type of 
identification taggant that was named was biological taggants.  These taggants used some 
biologically produced chemicals as a chemical taggant such as DNA or used conventional 
chemical taggants that were detected using biologically derived detection methods such as 
immunoassays [2].     
 Particulate or physical taggants continued to be the most fully studied identification 
taggant due to the 18 years of required use in Switzerland [2].  The Swiss experience with 
physical taggants has shown that they can be recovered and that when recovered, they can 
increase the rate at which crimes are solved [2].  Different types of physical taggants have 
the potential to sensitize some or all explosives, due to the “gritty” nature of small particles.  
The added particles may create areas with higher than usual friction, which could sensitize 
or cause detonation of the explosive [2].  Additionally, physical identification taggants that 
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can be used in explosives must be durable and unreactive in order to survive the detonation 
process.  This means, however, that they are likely to survive in the environment 
indefinitely and thus present a contamination risk both in the environment and any raw 
materials produced via the use of explosives such as mining or quarrying [2]. 
 Almost simultaneously with the publication of Taggants in Explosives, the country 
of Switzerland enacted a federal statute that required taggants to be added to explosives 
[2].  This legislation was enacted as a result of an increase in bombings that occurred during 
the late 1970s [2].  This statute requires that all explosives (dynamites, slurries, water gels, 
ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO), black powder) manufactured for consumption in the 
Swiss market must have a unique taggant per manufacturer that is changed twice a year 
[2], and a sample of the taggant is maintained by the Swiss federal government.  Three 
taggants are approved: the Microtaggant® a commercially produced version of the 3M 
taggant tested in Taggants for Explosives; HF6, which is a Swiss developed version of the 
Microtaggant®; and one called “…Explotracer that consists of orange polyethylene chunks 
permeated with fluorescent markers, embedded iron particles, and rare-earth oxides” [2].   
 According to Swiss authorities, the addition of identification taggants into 
explosives has helped law enforcement track explosives that were used, or attempted to be 
used, in terrorist or criminal acts [2].  In Switzerland, 254 incidents where explosives, were 
used in either improvised explosive devices or safecracking, occurred between 1984 and 
1994.  Of these, 44.4% were successfully solved when taggants were recovered in 63 cases.  
Of the remaining 191 cases where taggants were not recovered, only 16.2% were solved 
[2].  Therefore, the Swiss experience shows that when identification taggants are used and 
recovered, the case is twice as likely to be solved under their taggant program [2]. 
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 Isotopic taggants were also evaluated, although limited experience and testing 
meant that such evaluations were mostly preliminary.  The compatibility of isotopic 
taggants was judged to likely be acceptable since the proposed methods used parts per 
million of the additives.  Explosives manufacturing processes of the time did not require 
this level of control, so it was deemed unlikely that the addition of such a low concentration 
of another material would materially affect the properties [2].  Incomplete testing prevented 
a full assessment of the survivability and recoverability of isotopic taggants in post-blast 
residue, as only small-scale tests had been performed [2].  Due to their low concentrations 
and the necessity of identifying the different isotopes used, analysis requires more 
specialized equipment and techniques such as mass spectroscopy, which reduces the 
number of facilities capable of performing the analysis [2, 4, 5].  The low concentrations 
of the isotopic taggants were thought to significantly reduce the chances of environmental 
risks or cause many issues with contamination of mined raw materials by the taggants, 
although not enough data was available at the time to fully assess their impact [2].  The 
cost of isotopic taggants is relatively high, though the low concentrations required make 
them useful on an overall cost basis [2, 4]. 
 Biological taggants were also limited by the same lack of experience and testing 
that had hampered isotopic taggants.  The compatibility of a biological taggant was hard to 
assess given the preliminary nature of the research, though it is generally expected that low 
concentrations would lower the risk of incompatibility [2].  The survivability and 
recoverability of biologically based chemicals are uncertain due to the heat generated by 
detonation and the harsh environment present during the manufacturing of some types of 
explosives. An example of a harsh environment for biologically derived materials or 
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chemicals is the manufacture of ammonium nitrate prills, which takes place at high 
temperatures (145 to 155 ºC) and is strongly oxidizing as well [2]. A full evaluation of 
environmental acceptability and contamination of mined raw materials was not available 
at the time, but it was thought that the relatively low concentrations required would 
minimize the risk of biological taggants having a negative effect on these criteria.  The cost 
of biological taggants depends on the production cost of the biological components.  While 
not fully developed, it is expected that the low concentrations required would result in an 
acceptable cost for the benefits provided [2]. 
 This extensive report was commissioned as a direct reaction to a terrorist attack on 
the Alfred P. Murrah Building that used explosives.  At the time of publication in 1998, 
Marking and Rendering Inert evaluated a comprehensive identification taggant program as 
too expensive for the current bombing risk environment.  It proposed further investigation 
into identification taggants so that in the event that the risk of bombings increased, at least 
one type of identification taggant would be evaluated and the costs and benefits of such a 
program could be evaluated again [2].  An additional conclusion of the report was that 
based on the Swiss experience with identification taggants, a taggant program has been 
shown to aid in solving crimes such as bombings [2]. 
 The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 caused Congress to reconsider a requirement 
to use identification taggants in explosives.  As a component of the 1996 Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act, the second report on the feasibility of using identification 
taggants in explosives was commissioned and published in 1998 [2].  In the 18 years since 
the OTA report, three major developments in explosives tagging had occurred.  The first 
was the passage in July of 1980, of the Swiss act requiring all explosives manufactured for 
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the Swiss market to utilize an identification taggant program.  The second development 
was that despite an appropriations committee ban on the ATF investigating identification 
taggants, additional identification taggant concepts had been invented based on the new 
technologies that became available between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s [2].  The 
final development was the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Convention on 
Plastic Explosives from 1991 that required all signatories to adopt detection taggants in 
certain plastic explosives by the end of 1996.  The 1998 report mostly reiterated the results 
of the 1980 OTA report: using identification taggants was technically feasible, but the cost 
of the taggant program and concerns for safety still needed to be addressed [1, 2].  An 
additional consideration from this new report was that many of the proposed taggant 
methods were underdeveloped and required live testing before they could be fully 
evaluated [2].  Table 2.3 summarizes the developments that occurred between 1981 and 
1999. 
 




• ATF not permitted to research taggants 
Bombing of Alfred P. 
Murrah Building (1995) 
• Passage of Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act  
Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty 
Act (1996) 
• Commissioned Marking and Rendering Inert 
Marking and Rendering 
Inert (1998) 
• Provided updated evaluation criteria for 
identification taggants 
• Summarized status of research performed between 
1980 and publication (approximately 1998) 
• Emphasized importance of cost, compatibility, and 




 Modern taggants (2000- present).  The deadliest terrorist attack ever in 
the United States occurred on September 11, 2001 with the attack on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon buildings. This prompted the passage of several laws, including 
the Safe Explosive Act of 2002, which was part of Public Law 107-296, a larger bill that 
created the Department of Homeland Security [16].  The major component of this act was 
to restrict the unlicensed handling of explosives further than the Organized Crime Control 
Act with the introduction of additional sitipulations for authorized users of explosives.  As 
concerns over terrorism continued, research into identification taggants has continued as 
well.  Most new technologies such as nanotechnology or DNA sequencing have been 
proposed as potential identification taggant methods.  Older methods have also been 
adapted.  
 The Safe Explosives Act was passed as part of a larger bill that reorganized 
components of the federal government.  The explosives components of the law included 
the most significant changes to explosive licenses and eligibility since the passage of the 
1941 Federal Explosives Act.  Under this new law, all purchasers and users of explosives 
must hold a license or permit, whereas previously only purchasers or users of explosives 
across state lines were required to hold a license or permit [17].  Additional changes were 
made to categories of people prohibited from handling explosives [17]. 
 Research into taggants has continued to the modern day [4, 5, 18, 19], though 
available testing information and data remain scarce [5].  No new categories of 
identification taggants have been identified; however, improvements and refinements to 
the categories of physical, chemical, and biological taggants have occurred.  Physical 
taggants remain an active area of research [4, 5, 18, 20, 21].  One type of physical taggants 
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that have been proposed are particles containing quantum dots that emit light at specific 
frequencies, and the combination of frequencies can be used to encode information [4, 5].  
Physical taggants where rare earths or other fluorescent materials such as dyes are 
introduced to a carrier particle have been developed as well [4, 5, 18, 19].  These particles 
encode information in the colors and intensities of the light they emit [4, 5, 18].  These 
approaches are similar to the first taggants, which use different concentrations of various 
elements contained within a particle [22, 23] but exploit the fluorescence of the dyes or 
rare earths to also increase recoverability of the particles [5, 18]. Unique codes based on a 
sequence of nucleotides can encode information that would be needed for an identification 
taggant.  
 Due to the rapid development in the area of biology, DNA based identification 
taggants continue to be proposed and developed [2, 4, 5]. Only low concentrations of 
taggant are needed due to the amplification that can be obtained using polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) techniques [4, 5].  DNA sequences have been used commercially to tag 
pharmaceutical products like cancer drugs [4] as well as other anti-counterfeiting uses [5].  
DNA sequences can theoretically be of any length, which allows for a practically unlimited 
number of codes [4, 5].  Reading these sequences using a technique such as PCR is well 
understood, but the reagents, equipment, and expertise needed are a significant cost [4, 5].  
Additionally, the stability of a DNA sequence when subjected to the heat created by 
detonation is unknown and might preclude the use of DNA based identification taggants 
with explosives [2].   
 Small ceramic or metal oxide particles that contain fluorescent rare earth materials 
have been proposed as a taggant that can be used to identify if a particular type of material 
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has been used [19, 20, 21].  The combination of rare earths used and the intensity of the 
fluorescence can create a way of encoding information [4, 5, 20].  These particles can be 
recovered in the field using a UV lamp [21].  Analysis of the particle requires the use of 
sophisticated laboratory equipment and is correspondingly expensive [20, 21].   
 Similar glass particles have also been proposed as an identification taggant, where 
the concentration of the different fluorescent rare earth elements is used to encode 
information, unfortunately large charges that might be used in mining or other legal uses 
(>500 lbs.) do not allow the glass microspheres to survive detonation [18, 19].  The taggant 
elements can be added to the liquid glass, thus allowing for an even distribution of the 
elements that make up the identification taggant in the final particle [18, 19].  Small 
spherical glass particles, called microspheres, are already used in commercially produced 
explosives [18].  This identification taggant changes the composition of the microspheres 
that are added [18, 19].  As with other physical taggants such as the Microtaggant®, 
recovery of the taggant is the major concern [2, 19].  Tests were performed to judge the 
recoverability of these microsphere taggants, and showed mixed results for recoverability 
and survivability of this taggant, where the taggant could be recovered for small charges, 
but not for larger charges, and not in all cases [18, 19].   
 Recent taggant developments utilizing DNA or nanoparticles have occurred 
because of the increased interest in technologies that counteract terrorism.  This is a notable 
change from previous cycles in the United States where government efforts lead to research 
in identification taggants.   The shift in priority from crime to terrorism and the use of 
explosives in asymmetric warfare has caused the development of identification taggants to 
shift its priorities as well.  Current technologies are suited for commercially manufactured 
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explosives but are of limited use for homemade explosive materials.  The modern 
experience shows that a universal identification taggant that can be used effectively in 
identifying both commercially manufactured explosives and also homemade ones will be 
necessary for an effective identification taggant program. 
  An older technique, neutron activation analysis, has become more capable with 
modern computing power, software, and semiconductor manufacturing technology.  This 
technique can be used on samples regardless of their physical state and is thus well suited 
to analyzing post-blast residue to find chemical taggants.  Table 2.4 summarizes the events 
between 2000 and their reactions. 
 
Table 2.4. Summary of Events and Reactions between 2000 and the Current Day 
Event Reaction 
September 11th Terrorist 
Attacks (2001) 
• Passage of Safe Explosives Act of 2002 
• Creation of Department of Homeland Security 
US involvement in 
conflicts in the Middle 
East (2003-current) 





2.1.3. Summary of Taggants Literature.  Throughout the one hundred years of 
taggant development, the same cycle has repeated several times.  The cycle begins with a 
triggering event such as a terrorist attack involving explosives or a major war.  This event 
prompts the government to consider changes to law or regulations that would provide more 
identifying information about the explosives.  During the drafting of these laws or 
regulations, studies are performed into mechanisms that can provide the type of 
information desired, such as identification taggants.  The proposed mechanisms are then 
evaluated, and laws and regulations are finalized or ultimately rejected.  Additional 
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mechanisms are proposed and investigated, and the cycle begins again when the next 
triggering event occurs. 
 The implementation of a modern identification taggant would quickly provide 
useful information for criminal forensic investigations and aid in investigations of terrorist 
attacks involving explosives. Studies conducted in 1980 and 1998 have both shown that 
while technology existed that could be used as an identification taggant, the cost of a 
program and safety concerns were issues that would need to be resolved prior to 
implementation.  Additionally, any identification taggant must be rigorously tested before 
being utilized.  The 1998 report Marking and Rendering Inert identified other promising 
candidates, but concluded that the lack of full-scale testing meant that a more thorough 
evaluation would be needed.  
 The effectiveness of the different taggant technologies in meeting the identified 
evaluation criteria is described qualitatively with a score on a scale from one to five based 
on prior studies of taggants.  A score of five means the taggant technology performs 
extremely well in that category, and a score of one meaning the opposite.  Cost is also 
ranked on the same one to five scale, but with higher scores corresponding to lower taggant 
cost and cheaper analysis costs.  Therefore, the most effective taggant technologies will 
have the highest total score. A comparison of the different identification taggant 
technologies is shown in Table 2.5.   
 By total score, biological taggants are in last place due to concerns with 
recoverability and survivability of the taggant as well as the relatively high cost of taggants, 
and analysis of any recovered taggants [2].  Isotopic taggants meet all the criteria except 
for the high cost of production [2].  Chemical taggants are tied with isotopic, due to some  
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Table 2.5. Comparison of Identification Taggant Categories 






l [1] 5 5 3 5 4 22 
Chemical 




5 5 4 4 4 22 
Isotopic [2] 
 5 5 5 5 1 21 
Biological 




concerns over their recoverability and survivability [2].  Radiological taggants are tied for 
the highest score, with concerns over the total number of potential codes, as well as their 
cost [1].  Physical or particulate taggants share first place with radiological taggants.  Due 
to the low cost of physical or particulate taggants that also meeting most of the other 
criteria, research focus has focused on producing a cheap physical taggant that is 
compatible with explosives [1, 2].     
 
2.2. NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Several methods are capable of determining the composition of a chemical 
identification taggant.  An ideal method for use with chemical taggants for explosives must 
be able to detect concentrations with ppb precision to enable extremely low taggant 
concentrations to be used, be used with minimal sample processing to reduce losses of 
recovered taggant, and be able to determine the composition of the bulk material to measure 
the concentration of the taggant in undetonated explosives [1].  Mass spectroscopy is a 
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commonly used method to determine composition.  Many forms of mass spectroscopy have 
the requisite precision, but require significant processing of the material to create the ions 
that are analyzed and can only work on extremely small samples of material which 
precludes most samples of undetonated explosives [24].  An alternative to mass 
spectroscopy would be a technique such as inductively coupled plasma optical emission 
spectroscopy (ICP-OES or ICP-AES).  This technique introduces small quantities of a 
liquid sample into a high temperature plasma and measures the photons emitted as the 
sample atoms become ionized.  While highly precise, this technique also requires 
processing that would result in loses of recovered taggant material [25].  NAA is a 
technique that matches the ideal method: it has the requisite precision to measure 
concentrations down to the ppb level, it requires no additional processing of samples, and 
it measures the composition of the bulk sample [7].  As a result of these advantages, NAA 
was the chosen analytical technique used for all analysis and is discussed further in the 
following sections.  
2.2.1. Overview of NAA.   In its most basic form, NAA is a simple technique 
where a specimen of interest is exposed to a large neutron flux for a period of time.  While 
exposed to the neutron flux, the nuclei of the atoms making up the sample will be struck 
by neutrons and on occasion absorb them and convert from one isotope to a different one 
with an additional neutron.  These isotopes may later decay and produce characteristic 
gamma rays while doing so.  Using a specialized detector, the energy of the released 
gamma rays can be measured, allowing the isotope to be identified [26].  A schematic 









To calculate the NAA spectrum from a sample, it is necessary to consider all the isotopes 
of all the elements present in the sample.  Fortunately, many of the common, low Z (low 
atomic number) elements like O, N, etc. have very low capture cross sections and do not 
contribute to the resulting spectrum to any real extent [27].  Many heavier elements, and 
some of the taggant elements of interest have multiple stable isotopes that are present in 
appreciable amounts in nature and convert to active nuclei, which can be detected by NAA.  
Therefore, it is necessary to track the conversion of each isotope of each of the taggant 
elements to determine what they convert to, and determine if that resulting, transmuted 
isotope is active and can be identified with NAA. 
 With the set of taggant elements chosen for the nuclear barcode, there are 23 
naturally occurring isotopes that are present in less than 0.9% concentration [27].  They are 
organized in Table 2.6 into two columns: the first column contains isotopes that convert 
into active nuclei that can be detected by NAA [27], and the second column contains 
isotopes that convert into stable nuclei that cannot be detected by NAA [27]. The 17 
isotopes in column 1 are ideal isotopes to detect using NAA.  They have widely varying 
half-lives [27], which gives them each widely varying activities for a given irradiation time.  
 Modern NAA detectors can be run in multi-channel mode where they count the 
number of gamma rays that fall within a specific energy range as one channel and can 
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Table 2.6. Active and Stable Taggant Nuclei under NAA 
 
Column 1: Active Transmuted Nuclei Column 2: Stable Nuclei 
Eu-151 Eu-153 Dy-159 Dy-164 Ho-165 Lu-175 
Lu-176 Sm-144 Sm-147 Sm-150 Sm-152 Sm-154 









output the counts of all of the channels.  Each active isotope has a characteristic gamma 
spectrum that it emits as it decays.  Therefore, each active isotope will give a peak on the 
channel(s) that are closest in energy to their characteristic gamma rays [7].  This allows the 
experimenter to identify which elements are present, as long as they can emit enough of a 
signal to not be lost in background noise.  A good spectrum will resemble the results in 
Figure 2.3. 
 The spike at about 662 keV is the signal from 60Co, and is immediately apparent on 
the graph.  The green line at the top of the peak is the cursor used by the display program, 
and is not of any analytical significance.  A bad spectrum where the noise overwhelms the 
signal will lack any distinct peaks, as in Figure 2.3 between about 50 keV and 300 keV.  
Since the nuclear barcode uses such low concentrations of taggants, multi-channel NAA 
experiments can only be used when the background will not overwhelm the signal.  When 
these difficulties are overcome, the taggant elements can be identified very easily, as each 
element has a distinct spectrum, and can be readily identified by the peaks present on the 
plot. 
2.2.2. Mathematical Analysis.  With the software support available, even very 








instances where “peaks” are identified that are not actually present in the sample.  One 
criterion used to determine if a give peak is a real peak, or if it is statistical noise, is the 
ratio of the uncertainty in the net area under the peak and the net area under the peak itself 
(the number of counts for that particular peak).  If the uncertainty in the net number of 
counts is less than the number of counts under a particular peak, then that peak is classified 
as real.  In the opposite case, the peak is classified as noise, and not an actual peak. 
 NAA can also be used quantitatively [7].  When each active isotope emits its own 
characteristic gamma spectrum while irradiated, the detector identifies the energy of the 
emitted gamma ray and counts them.  However, even the best gamma ray detectors can 
only keep track of a limited number of different energy bins.  As a result, an active isotope’s 
peak is broadened into something resembling a bell curve.  Integrating the number of 
counts under the broadened peak gives the total activity associated with the active isotope 
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responsible for that peak.  This allows the amount of the active isotopes to individually be 
calculated, and thus give the concentrations associated with the nuclear barcode [7].  
 The usefulness of NAA is governed by the activity of the irradiated sample.  The 
activity of any material is governed by Equation 1: 
 




where 𝐴  is the activity of the sample from isotope 𝑖 , 𝜆  is the decay constant of the 
transmuted isotope, and 𝑁&'()*," is the number of atoms of the specific isotope 𝑖.   
The number of transmuted atoms of isotope 𝑖 can be calculated from the number of atoms 
of isotope 𝑖 − 1 in Equation 2: 
 




where 𝑁&'()*," is the number of transmuted atoms of isotope 𝑖; 𝑁"/0 is the number of atoms 
of isotope 𝑖 − 1; 𝜎"/0 is the neutron capture cross section of isotope 𝑖 − 1; 𝜙 is the neutron 
flux; and 𝑡 is the irradiation time of the sample.  Equation 2 provides the way to calculate 
the number of atoms that capture a neutron from the incident flux, which converts it from 
one isotope to another. Since both the flux 𝜙	and the neutron capture cross section 𝜎5,"/0 
are functions of the energy of the incident neutrons, the one group approximation will be 
used where these quantities are averaged to a single number [28].   
 The calculations carried out in Equations 1 and 2 describe the capture of one 
neutron from the flux by an isotope 𝑖.  In general, for normal neutron fluxes and irradiation 
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times, a nucleus will capture only one neutron, so there is no need to track transmutation 
from 𝑖 − 2 to 𝑖 − 1 for example.  As such, any of these secondary conversions can be 
ignored, as they are extremely unlikely to occur.  For the remaining analysis, the effects of 
these additional reactions will be ignored, and it will be assumed that the only reaction 
possible is the capture of a single neutron, after which the activated nucleus will simply 
decay. 
 The measured activity of a radioactive sample comes from the decay of the nuclei, 
which decay at a constant rate given by 𝜆.  Combining this information allows the quantity 
of an element to be identified by NAA using Equation 3 [7]. 
 




where 𝑚 is the mass of the mass of the element, 𝐶 is the net counts under the peak, 𝑡" is 
the time the sample was irradiated for, 𝑡K is the time between the irradiation of the sample 
and beginning to count the sample, 𝑡L is the duration of the measurement, 𝑀( is the atomic 
mass of the element, 𝛷&C  is the one group approximation of the flux the sample was 
exposed to, 𝜎DFF  is the one group approximation of the neutron capture cross section, 𝛤 is 
the probability of a gamma photon being emitted by a decay event, 𝜀 is the probability that 
an emitted photon will trigger a count in the detector, 𝜃 is the isotopic abundance of the 
target isotope, and 𝑁J is Avogadro’s number.  Since all of these quantities can be found in 




 The uncertainty in the measured mass of the element can also be determined [7].  
The uncertainty in the calculated mass, 𝑢L, of the element can be calculated by summing 
the product of the derivative of equation 3 with respect to each variable by the uncertainty 
in the value of each variable in equation 3 in quadrature.  This is shown in equation 4.  
 




2.2.3. Uses of NAA.  NAA is particularly well suited for determining the 
composition of materials that are a) hard to dissolve into solution, b) easy to contaminate 
while trying to dissolve them, c) are unique and should not be destroyed or dissolved, or 
d) have a surface composition different from the bulk [7].  Many diverse disciplines and 
experiments can make use of this technique, including archeology [26] and semiconductor 
manufacturing [7]. 
 NAA has been used in many fields since its invention to identify the composition 
of materials.  In archeology, it has been used to investigate so called “trace” and “ultra-
trace” elements present in clays used to make ceramics. These “trace” elements are present 
at parts per million level and “ultra-trace” at the parts per billion levels [29], which is the 
range of concentrations that the nuclear barcode uses.  In fact, archeology uses these 
elements to identify what some researchers call a “fingerprint” of the clay, since these 
elements, present at such low concentrations, are incredibly unlikely to be added to the 
clay.  The use of these “fingerprints” allows archeologists to identify the origin of the clay 
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used in ceramics, which can reveal trade routes and contact between different groups if the 
clay is from a significant distance from where the ceramics were discovered [29].  
 Semiconductor manufacturing requires extremely pure materials, as any impurities 
can affect the electrical properties of the resulting device.  In the manufacture of gallium 
arsenide (GaAs) based semiconductors, one important impurity is zinc (Zn), which acts as 
an electron acceptor and as such alters the electrical properties of the material [30].  Due 
to the sensitivity of GaAs based semiconductors to Zn impurities, accurately measuring the 
Zn concentration down to parts per billion level is crucial [30].  NAA and its derivatives 
are used to determine the concentration due to the accuracy and precision that is only 
possible with NAA, and not comparable techniques [30]. 
2.2.4. Summary of NAA.  NAA is an analytical technique that is well suited for 
use in identifying a taggant in post-blast residue.  The technique has strong theoretical 
underpinnings that allow for detailed analysis of the composition of the material.  
Additionally, the technique of NAA is well understood and an expression for the total 
uncertainty in the measurement of the composition of the material can be developed.  NAA 
can be used on any sample regardless of the physical form, and is capable of probing not 
just the surface composition of the material, but providing measurements of the bulk.  
These advantages have been realized in fields such as the semiconductor industry when 
analyzing contaminant concentrations in wafers down to parts per billion [30].  
Additionally, NAA is a nondestructive technique and this advantage has been used to great 
effect in archeology to identify the origins of ceramics by matching their compositions to 
clays [29].  These characteristics make NAA a good candidate technique for identifying an 
identification taggant in post-blast residue. 
 
47 
2.3. EXPLOSIVES LITERATURE REVIEW 
 An explosive is a material that undergoes a reaction known as detonation.  
Detonation produces a shockwave trailed by an extremely exothermic chemical reaction.  
Knowing the composition of the explosive allows the products of the reaction that occurs 
during detonation to be predicted.  Parameters such as the detonation velocity and 
detonation pressure that describe the performance of the explosive can be predicted based 
on this knowledge of the detonation products as well [31]. 
2.3.1. Explosives Chemistry.  Explosives react in an oxidation reaction, similar to 
the burning of a fuel.  During this reaction, different elements are “burned” with the oxygen 
present in the explosive to produce highly oxidized products such as CO2 or H2O that 
maximize the sharing of electrons between atoms, since this produces the most 
thermodynamically stable products.  Most explosives currently used are composed of four 
elements: carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, which can be written as CxHyNwOz.  It 
is generally assumed that the reaction occurs in two steps: first the explosive molecule 
separates into individual atoms due to the heat and energy, second the individual atoms 
react to form molecules and release energy that sustains the explosion.  Additionally, there 
is a hierarchy or ordering in which the products are produced: first, nitrogen atoms combine 
to make nitrogen gas, second hydrogen and oxygen react to form water vapor, third carbon 
and oxygen react to form carbon monoxide, fourth carbon monoxide and oxygen react to 
form carbon dioxide, and fifth any remaining oxygen atoms react to form oxygen gas.  
While the exact mechanism by which this system of reactions occurs is unknown, the 
ordering of these reactions is a good “rule of thumb”.  If the explosive molecule has too 
little oxygen, then the reactions will stop when all of the oxygen is consumed, since this 
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series of reactions occurs much faster than the products could mix with air from the 
environment [31].   
 Explosives that contain too little oxygen to fully convert carbon into carbon dioxide 
are called under oxidized explosives, explosives that produce oxygen gas are called 
overoxidized explosives, and explosives that fully convert carbon into carbon dioxide but 
do not produce any excess oxygen gas are called oxygen balanced explosives [31].  If an 
explosive is under oxidized, then incomplete reaction of carbon can occur, which produces 
solid carbon.  This solid carbon is then dispersed throughout the environment and deposited 
on surfaces from which it can be recovered as post-blast residue.  In real detonations, it is 
common to have pockets of overoxidation and under oxidation, so real detonations almost 
always produce post-blast residues.  Additional post-blast residue can be produced by small 
particles of the undetonated explosive that do not detonate [32].  Figure 2.4 shows post-
blast residue from a binary explosive that condensed onto a steel cylinder and was collected 
onto a cotton ball. 
2.3.2. Explosive Characterization.  Explosives can be characterized based on 
their reaction mechanism or their sensitivity.  Detonation is a process where the explosive 
material reacts and produces a shockwave with a velocity higher than the speed of sound 
in the material that contains the reaction zone.  Explosives that undergo detonation are 
called high explosives, and include materials such as trinitrotoluene (TNT) or 
nitroglycerine [31].  Low explosives do not produce a shock wave with a velocity that 
exceeds the speed of sound in the material and therefore do not undergo detonation.  Instead 
low explosives undergo deflagration, where the reaction zone moves through the material 






 Explosives are also characterized by their sensitivity to stimuli such as friction or 
impact.  The most sensitive explosives are referred to as primary explosives.  Primary 
explosives require minimal stimulus to detonate.  This characteristic makes them well 
suited for the use as initiators such as a blasting cap.  Secondary explosives are less 
sensitive than primary explosives but produce more energy per unit mass than primary 
explosives. Most can be detonated with a blasting cap.  This category contains common 
commercial and military explosives such as TNT and nitroglycerine.  Tertiary explosives 
are less sensitive than secondary explosives, and typically require a relatively large quantity 
of secondary explosive be detonated in order for tertiary explosives to detonate.  The most 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Post-blast Residue from Binary Explosive Collected onto a Cotton Ball 
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common example of a tertiary explosive is a mixture of ammonium nitrate with mass fuel 
oil (ANFO), which requires a booster charge composed of a secondary explosive when 
used in commercial blasting. 
2.3.3. Explosive Performance.  The explosive performance is dependent on 
several factors including the explosive used, the density of the explosive, and the degree of 
confinement of the explosive.  Each explosive has a characteristic detonation velocity, 
which is the rate at which the reaction zone moves through the explosive at the maximum 
density of the explosive that permits detonation.  In most explosives, if an explosive is too 
dense from being packed too tightly, detonation cannot sustain itself, and the explosive will 
not detonate [31].  The detonation velocity at densities other than the maximum density is 
typically linear and can be estimated.  The detonation pressure produced by an explosive 
is the product of the explosive density and the square of the detonation velocity divided by 
the ratio of specific heats of the detonation product gases plus one [31].  The detonation 
velocity and detonation pressure are measures of the power of an explosive.  The brisance 
or shattering strength of an explosive is also related to the detonation velocity [33].  
 The detonation of explosives destroys containers and produces fragments.  The 
distance these fragments travel can be estimated by several methods.  The most basic is 
through quantity-distance (QD), which takes the quantity of explosive and the distance 
from the explosive into account, and states that for a given quantity of explosives buildings, 
roads, etc. must be located beyond a certain distance [34].  In general, the further away 
from the explosive the fewer fragments.  QD methods often assume that anything within 
the distance is unsafe and anywhere outside of this radius is perfectly safe, even if it is one 
inch beyond this distance [34]. Modeling such as IMESAFR includes more factors than 
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just the quantity and distance by introducing simulations of the fragment dispersion [35].  
These simulations produce probabilistic assessments of damage or injury at different 
distances based on the quantity and type of explosive [35, 34].  At the lab scale, it is 
possible to approximate the fragment production and distribution.  The Gurney equation is 
used to determine the initial velocity of a fragment, the Mott equation to determine the 
number of fragments below a certain mass, and ballistics to determine the trajectory and 
time of flight of these fragments [31]. 
2.3.4. Summary of Explosives.  When a material explodes, it produces large 
quantities of gaseous products and large amounts of energy.  If the explosive, or part of the 
explosive, is under oxidized, then the detonation process will not result in the complete 
oxidation of carbon.  This carbon can then be deposited on surfaces and collected as post-
blast residue.  Depending on the performance of the explosive, materials near it may be 
fragmented and scattered about.  These fragments may contain traces of post-blast residue 
that can be sampled to collect an identification taggant, and their locations can be predicted 
by simulation or approximation. 
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3. NUCLEAR BARCODE CONCEPT 
 The taggant developments described in Section 2.1 have prompted the creation of 
a new identification taggant, the Nuclear Barcode, that is proposed to satisfy the key 
characteristics of a successful identification taggant better than previously developed 
taggants.   The nuclear barcode focuses on allowing identification taggant to survive the 
detonation process intact, prevent counterfeiting or obscuration, as well as providing a 
sufficiently large number of potential codes to enable labeling individual batches of 
product.  The nuclear barcode is designed to accomplish these goals inexpensively while 
also not affecting the properties or sensitivity of the tagged explosive. 
 
3.1. NUCLEAR BARCODE CONCEPT DESCRIPTION  
 The nuclear barcode is a proposed identification taggant.  It falls between a physical 
taggant and a chemical taggant that uses the combination of concentrations of rare earth 
and other elements to encode information.  This provides a large number of possible codes.  
The present design of the nuclear barcode would use 40 different concentrations of eight 
elements, giving a total of 408 or 6.56 trillion unique combinations. This number can be 
increased further by using a larger number of elements or by using a larger number of 
concentration levels.  The number of codes allows for a relatively large amount of 
information to be included in the codes such as the type of explosive, manufacturer, and 
enable identifying individual batches of the explosive products.  This capability would 
represent a notable improvement compared to the system mandated in Switzerland [2].  A 









 Additionally, recovery of the nuclear barcode taggant is simple, requiring only a 
sample of the post-blast residue that can be recovered with minimal training.  Unlike most 
chemical taggants, the exact chemicals that are added to the explosive do not influence the 
recoverability or survivability of the taggant, as long as the elements are added in the 
correct concentrations.  The nuclear barcode uses neutron activation analysis (NAA) to 
identify the concentration levels, which identifies the elements present in a sample by their 
nuclei and not their chemistry.    
 The elements used to create the nuclear barcode taggant are relatively expensive, 
being rare earth elements or precious metals, but they only need to be added in small 
concentrations (ppb to a few ppm). The use of NAA allows for the higher cost taggant 
elements to be used in concentrations down to 100 parts per billion (ppb), thus decreasing 
the cost of the taggant materials.  This represents a tradeoff that reduces the cost of the 
taggant materials but increases the cost of the analysis, however, this tradeoff is 
economically favorable overall.  Preliminary studies have been performed using the rare 
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earth elements holmium (Ho), samarium (Sm), and europium (Eu) [36].  These elements 
were introduced into explosives as sulfates, and the most expensive of these materials cost 
approximately $15 per gram.  At the average concentration of 1 ppm, this would be a 
sufficient quantity to tag one metric ton of explosives, and add about 1.5¢ per kilogram of 
explosives in material costs. This low material cost enables the tagging of any explosive 
material and may be suitable for use with some explosive precursors used in improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) as well. A schematic illustrating the use of the nuclear barcode is 
shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
 




 As a taggant that is introduced at low concentrations, the effect of the nuclear 
barcode on the reactivity of energetic materials is minimal.  Concentrations of components 
in manufacturing of explosives are not controlled with ppm tolerances, and the addition of 
these materials will not pose any problems to long-term stability either.  Additionally, since 
the nuclear barcode taggant relies on the elements present and not on physical particles, 
there is no additional material that might be rough and cause increased sensitivity.  
Preliminary testing has shown no notable reactivity of two types of explosives with the rare 
earth elements holmium, samarium, and europium, although no long-term stability tests 
have been performed.  Charges of a commercial binary explosive as well as composition 
B have been tagged with one or three rare earth elements at concentrations from 1 ppm to 
14 ppm, with no apparent change in explosive properties.    
 The nuclear barcode provides solutions to the two largest issues raised in both the 
1980 OTA report and the 1998 report: the cost of taggant and the potential for an 
identification taggant to sensitize the explosive to which it was added.  The quantity of the 
higher cost taggant elements is controlled through the use of low concentrations, which is 
enabled by NAA.  Since NAA is used to analyze the low concentrations, the cost of 
analyzing a sample will be high, since research reactors and neutron sources that can be 
used for NAA are few in number.  This higher cost can be minimized by analyzing fewer 
samples; under ideal circumstances, only one sample would be required.  Sensitization of 
explosives is also controlled through the use of low concentrations of taggant elements.  
The nuclear barcode also retains the advantages of modern identification taggants: 
survivability of the taggant in the post-blast residue, and forensic utility of the taggant.  
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These traits make the nuclear barcode a promising candidate as an identification taggant 
for explosives. 
 
3.2.  NUCLEAR BARCODE CONCEPT EVALUATION 
 The nuclear barcode taggant takes the higher compatibility with explosives from 
chemical taggants and combines it with the other properties of a physical taggant to 
produce a hybrid that performs better than previously developed taggant technologies.  The 
nuclear barcode accomplishes forensic goals while also being relatively cheap to 
implement and having a minimal safety impact.  Although the price of the materials used 
to tag explosives using the nuclear barcode is high, the use of neutron activation analysis 
for analyzing the results means the added cost from the taggant itself is low.   Additionally, 
the low concentrations used also ameliorate the safety concerns, as manufacturing of 
explosives is not affected by concentrations at these low levels.   
 The survivability of the nuclear barcode must be established, since it enjoys a 
relative advantage in comparison to other physical and chemical taggants other areas.  If 
the nuclear barcode proves survivable, then it would represent an improved taggant over 
previously developed ones.  Section 1.3 presents four research objectives that assess the 
survivability of an identification taggant that are reproduced here: 
 





2. Determine if the different concentration levels of the taggant elements can be 
distinguished via NAA with sufficient precision that the measured concentration 
lies within only one concentration level (50 ppb precision to use the Nuclear 
Barcode as designed). 
 
3. Determine the distinguishability of the taggant elements from background signals, 
including other taggant elements and common elements in the environment such as 
sodium, potassium, chlorine, etc. 
 
4. Identify concentrations of the taggant elements in the post blast residues and verify 
them to be the same as in the undetonated sample. 
 
 To test these objectives, a series of eight tests was developed.  For each taggant 
element, these tests must determine the lowest concentration of the taggant element that 
can be measured, determine the survivability of the taggant element in post-blast residue, 
determine the effect of the type of explosive on the survivability of the taggant element, 
and determine the repeatability of measuring the concentration of the taggant element in 
post-blast residue.  All of these must be determined simultaneously when multiple elements 
are included, and the different elements must not prevent one another from being measured.  
These tests are further described in Section 4.  A summary of these tests and the research 





Table 3.1.  Summary of Tests Performed and Which Objectives they Address 
Test Series Test Objective Research 
Objectives  
Single Element Standard Solutions Best case detectability of elements at low concentration 1,2 
Single Element Binary Post-Blast Survivability of elements in post-blast residue 3,4 
Single Element Composition B 
Post-Blast 
Effect of explosive type on 
survivability 3,4 
Multi-Element Standard Solutions Best case simultaneous survivability of elements 1,2,3 
Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Simultaneous survivability of elements in post-blast residue 1,3,4 
Multi-Element Composition B 
Post-Blast 
Effect of explosive type on 
simultaneous survivability of 




Repeatability of simultaneous 
survivability of elements in post-
blast residue 
1,2,3,4 
Multi-Element Composition B 
Repeatability 
Effect of explosive type on 
repeatability of simultaneous 






4. RESEARCH METHODS 
 The four research objectives stated in Section 1.3 led to the development of a series 
of eight tests to address the issue of the survivability of the nuclear barcode.  This section 
describes the NAA procedure that was used to measure the samples from the eight test 
series in Section 4.1.  Sections 4.2 through 4.9 describe the procedures for each test series, 
the objectives the test evaluates, and what a successful or unsuccessful test for each 
objective would entail.   
 
4.1. NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS USING MISSOURI S&T REACTOR 
  The sample preparation for each test is described in Sections 4.2 to 4.9.  This 
section describes the preparation of a sample for NAA, the process of NAA as performed 
at the MSTR, and the process of counting a sample.  
 Samples are prepared before undergoing NAA to prevent the sample from breaking 
in the pneumatic tube system that transfers samples to and from the core.  Samples were 
first placed in two small, one inch by two inch plastic bags.  These plastic bags were then 
placed in a 20 mm diameter by two inch long plastic vial that snaps closed at the top.  Once 
the vial is closed, any plastic that extends beyond the diameter of the vial is cut using 
scissors.  The top of the vial is then sealed using a heat gun to ensure that the vial remains 
closed during transfers to and from the core.  When a liquid sample was used, a small vial 
approximately five mm by ½ inch long that contained 0.5 mL (for single element standard 
solution tests) or 0.495 mL (for multi-element standard solution tests) of liquid was sealed 
in the same manner as a larger vial. 
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 The pneumatic system that transfers the sealed samples to the core is called the 
rabbit system, since it takes approximately one second to travel the full length.  Outside of 
the core, the sealed sample is loaded into a glove box that contains one end of the rabbit 
system.  The sealed sample is inserted into a tube, and when the system is pressurized, 
transferred into a similar tube that is located in the reactor core.  All irradiations used the 
bare rabbit tube; where the sealed samples were transferred to a tube that was not shielded 
by a sheet of cadmium, which exposed the samples to the thermal and fast flux produced 
by the reactor.  A cadmium shielded rabbit tube was also available.  Cadmium shields 
samples from thermal neutrons, so the only neutrons that would interact would have higher 
energies.  After ten minutes, the sealed sample was transferred from the tube in the reactor 
core back to the tube in the glove box where it could be retrieved and the next sample could 
be irradiated. 
 When a sample was measured, it was first removed from the sealed vial that carried 
it through the rabbit system to the core.  The sample was placed in a new plastic bag, and 
was then placed on the end cap of one of two HPGe detectors.  After the first detector failed 
during measuring one sample of 500 ppb samarium solution, later samples used only the 
second detector that did not fail.  Canberra’s ProSpect software was used to control the 
detector and to collect the data.  All samples were counted for one hour of counting time.  
This meant that longer than one hour of real time elapsed per sample due to the detector 
phenomenon of deadtime.  When a critical number of photons hit the detector, the detector 
briefly loses the ability to measure any additional photons; the amount of time a detector 
stays in this state is called deadtime since the detector is not doing any work.  Deadtime is 
usually expressed as a percent of the total time the detector was active, and deadtimes of 
 
61 
5% were typically observed.  Deadtime can be reduced either through less active samples 
or better detectors, but cannot be completely eliminated.   
 After the data was collected for one hour of counting time, the resulting NAA 
spectrum was analyzed.  The spectrum was gone through manually to identify peaks or 
potential peaks.  The ProSpect software was used to match the shape of the peaks and 
calculate the total area under the curve of the manually fitted peaks.  Additionally, the 
ProSpect software was used to estimate the net area (counts) under the peak and the 
background counts under the peak.  After manual fitting, the software’s built in peak search 
routine was run with a sensitivity of 2 to identify any additional peaks.  In most 
circumstances, this process “identified” additional peaks that were determined to be not 
present after manually inspecting them, so the sensitivity settings were overly aggressive.  
In almost all circumstances, the peak search routine identified the manually identified 
peaks with good agreement with the shape of the peak, confirming that they were present.  
The net number of counts from the best fit of manual or software peak search routine was 
used as judged by the calculated gaussian ratio fit to the NAA spectrum.  This number of 
counts, along with the amount of real time the detector operated for, the length of the 
irradiation time, and the delay time were then used to calculate the concentration of the 
taggant elements in the sample using Equation 3. 
 
4.2. SINGLE ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS   
 The first series of tests was performed on solutions of three representative elements: 
holmium (Ho), samarium (Sm), and europium (Eu). The three elements were dissolved in 
deionized (DI) water and made into five solutions, each of a different concentration of one 
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taggant element.  The five concentrations used were 100, 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 4,000 parts 
per billion (ppb) on an atom basis, and measured using NAA.  These concentrations cover 
the proposed range for the nuclear barcode and extend to higher concentrations.  These 
solution tests were performed first to judge the effectiveness of the NAA parameters chosen 
and the suitability of the candidate elements for analysis with NAA.   
4.2.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via 
NAA at the Desired Concentration.  This test series represents a best-case scenario for 
detecting and determining the concentrations of these elements; the test samples contain 
only the taggant element and DI water, which does not show up under these test conditions.  
Using these samples, it is possible to determine the minimum concentration of these 
taggant elements that can be detected using the MSTR and the detectors available there.  
To meet this objective, it must be possible to accurate measure the concentration of the 
taggant elements contained in the solutions.  Any other result would mean the test fails to 
meet this objective. 
4.2.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant 
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA.  The single element standard 
Solutions also offer the best-case scenario for determining the uncertainty in calculating 
the concentration of the taggant elements.  The measurements of the uncertainty will 
depend only on the limits of the technique of NAA itself and not on any other conditions.  
This series of tests determines the minimum spacing between the concentration levels that 
can be used with the nuclear barcode.  For the nuclear barcode to work, the concentration 
must be able to be put into one and only one of the concentration levels.  Since the 
concentration levels are separated by 100 ppb, the maximum uncertainty in the 
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concentration should be half of that or 50 ppb to make sure that the concentration would 
stay within one concentration level.  This test meets this objective by having the uncertainty 
in the concentration of the taggant element below 50 ppb. 
 
4.3. MULTI-ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS   
 The multi-element standard solutions build on the single element standard solution 
tests by adding an additional complicating factor.  Instead of the samples containing only 
one taggant element, samples were prepared that contained all three of the taggant elements 
tested.  Six total combinations of the three elements at three different concentrations (500 
ppb, 1,000 ppb, and 2,000 ppb) were prepared, all of which are concentrations the nuclear 
barcode was designed to use.  
4.3.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via 
NAA at the Desired Concentration.  The additional activity caused by the presence of 
multiple of these elements produces additional noise in the measured NAA spectrum.  This 
noise reduces the prominence of the peaks that are detected.  This objective is met if the 
added noise in the NAA spectrum does not prevent accurately measuring the concentration 
of the taggant elements in the prepared solutions. 
4.3.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant 
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA.  This series of tests allows for 
the determination of the magnitude of this effect for combinations of these three elements.  
The higher noise in the NAA spectrum mentioned in the previous objective should increase 
the uncertainty in the calculated concentration of the taggant elements present.  Otherwise, 
this is still close to a best-case scenario for the detection of the taggant elements and 
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measuring their concentrations.  The concentration levels determined by this series of 
experiments should be much more in line with what can be expected to be used for 
undetonated explosives or for other materials, since the most common components in 
explosives (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen) also are not detectable using NAA 
like the DI water used in these solutions.  Similar to the single element standard solutions, 
this test series requires that the concentrations of the different taggant elements be 
simultaneously resolved to within 50 ppb to meet this objective. 
4.3.3. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from 
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the 
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc.  The multi-element standard 
solution test series directly tests the ability of NAA to differentiate between the different 
taggant elements used.  This is one component of this third objective addressing the 
survivability of the nuclear barcode.  In general, elements that are close in atomic number 
and are chemically similar, like rare earth elements, are harder to separate using NAA than 
elements that are not chemically similar.  This test series directly evaluates if the three 
taggant elements are able to be separated using NAA.  The number of codes the nuclear 
barcode can create is a function of the number of distinct elements used.  Interference where 
the presence of one element prevents the identification of a second element would reduce 
this number and be detrimental to the nuclear barcode.  This test meets this objective if 
each element has at least one peak in the NAA spectrum that does not overlap with any 




4.4. SINGLE ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST 
 The most basic test to determine the detectability of holmium and samarium in the 
post-blast residue introduces these taggant elements into the undetonated explosives at 
higher concentration than would be used in the finished nuclear barcode.  The explosive 
charges were a commercially manufactured, cap sensitive binary explosive: ammonium 
nitrate and nitromethane, which separately will not detonate, but when combined will 
detonate.  The binary used has a maximum velocity of detonation (VOD) of 6,300 m/s [37].  
 Due to the difficulties first encountered when measuring out quantities of taggant 
material on the small charges used in these experiments (160 grams for binary explosive 
charges), larger concentrations than proposed for the nuclear barcode were added to the 
charges in this initial demonstration.  For the holmium tests, the binary charges were each 
tagged with 0.00685 grams of holmium sulfate, giving a holmium mass concentration of 
19,000 ppb to 20,000 ppb based on the manufacturing tolerances of the binary explosive.  
Similar concentrations were used for the samarium binary tests, but used 0.00789 grams of 
samarium sulfate per charge.  Terrorist attacks would use significantly higher amounts of 
explosive and produce a larger amount of post-blast residue.   Once the tagging process is 
scaled up to a commercial manufacturing level, the whole process would be scaled up and 
the quantities of taggant materials for a typical batch of explosives would be easier to 
measure. 
  Five charges were prepared: two were tagged with holmium, two with samarium, 
and the fifth was untagged to provide a control.  The tagged, undetonated explosive charges 
were put in a steel cylinder to provide a surface from which post-blast residue could be 
collected.  A new steel cylinder was used for each test to eliminate cross-contamination 
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between different tests.  A steel cylinder acts as a stand in for a trashcan or a piece of debris 
where post-blast residue from a real terrorist attack might be deposited. Figure 4.1 shows 
the setup of the charge within the cylinder (Figure 4.1a) and the same cylinder after 
detonation (Figure 4.1b). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Single Element Binary Post-Blast Test Showing the Charge Contained within 
the Steel Cylinder. Denoted (a) and the Same Cylinder after Detonation, with Post-Blast 
Residue Apparent at the Center (b). A Representative Sampling Path is Indicated by the 




 The single element binary post-blast test series was chronologically the first test 
series performed on post-blast residues.  The testing methodology of all post-blast tests 
was based on the method developed for this series.  After the explosive was detonated, a 
pre-weighed cotton ball was used to collect the post-blast residue.  The cotton ball was 
dabbed along the dotted lines shown in Figure 4.1a to collect post blast residue deposited 
on the steel cylinder by the top, center, and bottom of the charge.  After collecting the post-
blast residue, the cotton ball was weighed again. The quantity of post-blast residue that was 
recovered is therefore the difference between the mass of the cotton ball before swabbing 
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and after swabbing.  Before detonation, a separate pre-weighed cotton ball was used to 
sample the same path that was used post-blast to provide a control and determine if the 
taggant elements were present in the steel cylinder itself.  A third, clean, cotton ball was 
used as an additional control to ensure that no taggant elements were present on the cotton 
ball initially.  Each post-blast test produced three samples: a cotton ball with post-blast 
residue, a cotton ball without post-blast residue, and a clean cotton ball. 
4.4.1. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from 
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the 
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc.  This series of tests establishes 
a best-case scenario for detecting the taggant elements in the post-blast residue by using 
concentrations higher than specified by the nuclear barcode.  This test series also 
establishes if the individual taggant elements will encounter any interference from the other 
elements present in the post blast residue.  This test meets this objective if at least one peak 
from the taggant element can be identified in the NAA spectrum of the post-blast residue. 
4.4.2. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast 
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample.  This series 
of tests on holmium and samarium tagged explosives provides the simplest test for 
identifying the taggant element in the post-blast residue, determining its concentration, and 
comparing its composition to the undetonated explosive. Only one taggant element is 
present in each explosive charge, so there should be no interferences from the other taggant 
elements.  Additionally, the binary explosive produces the largest quantity of post-blast 
residue of the two types of explosive tested.  Further enhancing the detectability of the 
taggant element is that the concentrations used are higher than prescribed by the nuclear 
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barcode.  This test meets this objective if the measured concentration of the taggant element 
in the post-blast residue is equal to the concentration of the taggant element in the 
undetonated explosive. 
 
4.5. SINGLE ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST 
 The explosives charges used in these tests were two 60 gram charges of cast 
Composition B manufactured as a 50/50 mixture of TNT and RDX on site and tagged with 
holmium.  Composition B has a maximum VOD ranging from 7600 to 8000 m/s [31].  Two 
tagged holmium charges were used to compare to the binary explosive charges tagged with 
holmium.  Larger concentrations than proposed for the nuclear barcode were added to the 
charges in this initial demonstration, due to the relatively small size of the charges.  For 
these tests, 0.00170 grams of holmium sulfate was added giving a concentration of 2,000 
ppb to 3,000 ppb for each charge.  Unlike the binary post-blast series of tests, no charges 
were tagged with samarium.  This is because holmium is a monoisotopic element, which 
simplifies detection in the post-blast residue.  Therefore, any differences in the 
survivability of the taggant that are observed are due to the use of Composition B. 
 The single element Composition B post-blast series of tests adds an additional layer 
of complexity to the single element binary post-blast test series due to the reduced quantity 
of post-blast residue produced by Composition B.  This is likely due to a combination of 
factors such as Composition B’s higher velocity of detonation, and the binary explosive’s 
requirement for even mixing for maximum performance which was not always practical to 
achieve.  While the lower quantity of post-blast residue means that a smaller quantity of 
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other elements will be present in the sample, it also means that less of the taggant elements 
will be present as well. 
4.5.1. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from 
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the 
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc.  This test series is designed to 
determine if the reduced amount of taggant elements in the post-blast residue make 
identifying the taggant element harder than in the single element binary post-blast test 
series.  Like the single element binary post-blast test series, a real-world terrorist attack 
would likely involve much larger quantities of explosives that would produce 
correspondingly larger quantities of post-blast residue, so the reduced quantity of residue 
produced by Composition B represent a low end estimate for the post-blast residue 
recovered.  Like the single element binary post-blast test series, this test meets the objective 
if at least one peak from the taggant element can be identified in the NAA spectrum of the 
post-blast residue.  
4.5.2. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast 
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample.  This series 
of single element Composition B post-blast tests also attempts to directly answer this last 
objective under worse conditions than the single element binary post-blast test series.  The 
reduced quantity of post-blast residue produced by the detonation of composition B also 
reduces the amount of recovered taggant.  This makes detecting the taggant element harder 
and thus makes quantifying the concentration of the taggant element in the post-blast 
residue more difficult than in the residue produced from the binary explosive.  This test 
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meets this objective under the same conditions as the single element binary post-blast 
residue test series. 
 
4.6. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST 
 The multi-element binary post-blast test series adds the complication of recovering 
the taggant elements in the post-blast residue.  A total of six combinations of the three 
elements were each added to an undetonated explosive like the previous multi-element 
standard solution test series.  The concentrations used were doubled to 1,000 ppb, 2,000 
ppb, or 4,000 ppb.  These concentrations were used due to limits on measuring out the 
required quantities of salts containing the taggant elements when used with changes that 
were either approximately 150 grams or 50 grams.  This would not be a problem when 
scaled up to the volume that manufacturers of explosives produce.  Each element was tested 
twice each of the three concentrations.  These charges used the same commercially 
available binary explosive as used in the single element post-blast test.  The same test 
procedure was used as in the single element binary post-blast tests.   Figure 4.2 shows the 
setup of the tagged explosive in the steel cylinder before detonation (Figure 4.2a) and the 
deposited post-blast residue after detonation (Figure 4.2b). 
4.6.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via 
NAA at the Desired Concentration.  This series of tests essentially used a cut down 
version of the nuclear barcode with fewer total combinations.  This represents a real world 
test on detecting the taggant elements and determining their concentrations from the post-
blast residue using concentrations proposed by the nuclear barcode.  Additionally, the 
concentrations used in this series of tests are lower than the concentrations used in the 
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single element binary post-blast series.  This objective is met if the concentration of the 






Figure 4.2. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Charge and Witness Plate. Before 




4.6.2. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from 
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the 
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc.  The multi-element binary  
post-blast test series combines a test for the interference between different taggant elements 
like the multi-element standard solution test series with a test for interference between the 
taggant element and the post-blast residue like the single element binary post-blast test 
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series.  This series performs the first real-world tests designed to determine if the taggant 
elements can simultaneously be found in the post-blast residue, which meets this objective 
it this test series is able to do so. 
4.6.3. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast 
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample.  The 
multi-element binary post-blast test series introduces two complications to the single-
element binary post-blast test series.  First, the concentrations of two of the three taggant 
elements in each test in the series fall within the range prescribed by the nuclear barcode.  
Additionally, this test series introduces multiple taggant elements to the post-blast residue.  
These concentrations need to be calculated simultaneously for the nuclear barcode concept 
to prove functional.  This test also will determine if the interference from the different 
elements prevents the identification of the taggant elements or the determination of their 
concentrations.  If the concentrations of the taggant elements can be measured 
simultaneously and determined to be the same as the concentrations of the taggant elements 
in the undetonated explosive, then this test series meets this objective. 
 
4.7. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST   
 Not all explosives are equal.  The multi-element composition B post-blast test series 
used the same combinations of taggant elements and their concentrations that were used in 
the multi-element binary post-blast test series but changed the type of explosive used from 
a commercially produced binary explosive to the same composition B formulation used in 
the single element Composition B post-blast tests.  The single element Composition B post-
blast testing showed that Composition B produces much less post-residue than the binary 
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explosive, which reduces the amount of taggant recovered in the post-blast residue 
compared to the binary explosive.   
4.7.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via 
NAA at the Desired Concentration.  This series of tests was designed to determine if the 
smaller quantity of post-blast residue gathered from these tests still permits the 
simultaneous identification of the taggant elements and their concentrations.  This test 
series meets the objective under the same conditions as the multi-element binary post-blast 
test series. 
4.7.2. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from 
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the 
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc.  As with the single element 
version of this test series, the multi-element composition B post-blast test series is designed 
to show the effect of the reduced recovery of post-blast residue on the ability to distinguish 
the different taggant elements in the post-blast residue.  This test series meets this objective 
under the same conditions as the multi-element binary post-blast test series. 
4.7.3. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast 
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample.  This test 
compares the ability of NAA to accurately measure the concentration of the taggant 
elements in the lower quantity of post-blast residue produced by the detonation of 
Composition B compared to the binary used.  This test series meets this objective if it is 
possible to simultaneously measure the concentration of the taggant elements in the lower 
amount of post-blast residue produced from Composition B and determine these 
concentrations to be the same as in the undetonated explosive. 
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4.8. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY REPEATABILITY POST-BLAST 
 A series of repeatability tests where the same combination of taggant elements and 
their concentrations were added to five separate charges of a commercially produced binary 
explosive.  2,000 ppb of holmium, 1,000 ppb of samarium, and 4,000 ppb of europium 
were added to five identical charges of each type of explosive.  This test series followed 
the same procedure described in the multi-element binary post-blast test series.   
4.8.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via 
NAA at the Desired Concentration.  This series of tests investigates how frequently the 
taggant elements holmium, samarium, and europium can be expected to be recovered from 
the post-blast residue when introduced at concentrations suggested by the nuclear barcode.  
This has real-world implications by showing how many samples of the post-blast residue 
will need to be obtained from the site of an actual detonation to definitively show the 
presence and concentrations of the taggant elements.  This test series successfully meets 
this objective if the taggant elements can be simultaneously resolved and their 
concentrations measured in each sample.  
4.8.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant 
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA.  While the uncertainty in the 
concentrations can be obtained from any post-blast residue test series; the multi-element 
binary repeatability series of tests represents the first series where a fuller determination of 
the degree of concentration level separation that is feasible can occur.  The uncertainties in 
the measured concentrations of each element in the post-blast residue are determined five 
times in this test series.  This allows for the determination of the average uncertainty in the 
concentration, as well as permitting more advanced statistical analysis of the uncertainties 
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than would be possible with only one test.  This series of tests produces a lower limit on 
the separation between concentration levels that can be determined from measurements of 
the post-blast residue for low explosives such as the ammonium nitrate based binary 
explosive used in this series of experiments.  This series of tests meets this objective if the 
uncertainty in the concentrations, on average, is less than 50 ppb.  This would permit the 
nuclear barcode to use concentration levels separated by 100 ppb as designed.  
4.8.3. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from 
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the 
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc.  The multi-element binary 
repeatability test series is designed to determine if the taggant elements can consistently be 
distinguished from other elements in the post-blast residue.  Since the prepared explosive 
charges are the same, the only variation will come from the process of depositing the post-
blast residue for each detonation.  Establishing the consistent ability to distinguish the 
taggant elements in the post-blast residue means that in a real usage scenario, fewer 
samples of the post-blast residue will be needed to determine the presence or absence of 
the nuclear barcode.  This objective is met if at least one peak from each of the taggant 
elements can be simultaneously identified in the NAA spectrum of the post-blast residue. 
4.8.4. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast 
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample.  The  
multi-element binary repeatability test series should behave identically to the specific test 
from the multi-element binary post-blast test that uses the same combination of 
concentrations.  This series of tests gathers more data about the performance of this one 
combination of taggant elements and concentrations, which enables statistical analysis of 
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the results for the particular combination used.  This test meets this objective by accurately 
measuring the concentration of the three taggant elements simultaneous and determining 
them to be equal to the concentration in the undetonated explosive. 
 
4.9. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B REPEATABILITY POST-BLAST 
 A series of repeatability tests was also performed using composition B based 
charges, that were otherwise the same as the tests in the multi-element binary repeatability 
test series.  This series of tests is necessary to show that this higher variance still permits 
accurate determination of the concentration of the taggant elements used.  Like the multi-
element binary repeatability tests, this series of tests also has real world implications on 
the number of post-blast residue samples that will need to be collected. 
4.9.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via 
NAA at the Desired Concentration.  Since Composition B produces less post-blast 
residue than the binary explosive used in the previous test, it presents a more challenging 
test of determining the concentrations. Whether this test series meets this objective is 
determined in the same method as the multi-element binary repeatability post-blast test 
series. 
4.9.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant 
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA.  As with the multi-element 
binary repeatability test, the multi-element composition B repeatability test yields more 
information than would be offered by just a single test.  Since composition B produces less 
post-blast residue, and since the calculation of the concentration of the taggant elements 
and their uncertainties depend in part on the mass of the post-blast residue that is recovered, 
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this test series presents the most challenging situation for the nuclear barcode.  The small 
quantities of post-blast residue obtained must contain enough of the taggant elements to 
determine the concentration levels.  Additionally, this test series is necessary to determine 
if the explosive used has some effect on the concentrations of the elements found in the 
post-blast residue.  This test series meets this objective in the same manner as the multi-
element binary repeatability test series. 
4.9.3. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from 
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the 
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc.  Like the multi-element binary 
repeatability test, the multi-element composition B repeatability test will allow the 
determination of the consistency with which the taggant elements can be distinguished 
from the remainder of the post-blast residue.  The lower quantity of post-blast residue 
available increases the variability in determining the concentrations of the taggant 
elements.  Using composition B could potentially increase the variability in distinguishing 
the taggant elements in the post-blast residue due to the lower quantity of post-blast residue 
and thus taggant elements collected.  This test series meets this objective under the same 
conditions as the multi-element binary repeatability post-blast test series. 
4.9.4. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast 
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample.  Like the 
multi-element binary repeatability test, the multi-element composition B repeatability test 
provides additional data points of the concentrations of the taggant elements collected from 
post-blast residues of explosives tagged with a particular combination of taggant elements  
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and concentrations.  The additional data also allows for statistical analysis of the 
concentrations.  Beyond this additional level of analysis, this test meets this objective under 




5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 Section 5 presents the results of performing NAA as described in Section 4.1 on 
the samples from the tests described in Section 4.2 through 4.9.  Additionally, at the end 
of each test, a table is included that evaluates if the test meets or fails to meet each objective 
that it was designed to evaluate.  Section 5.9 provides an evaluation of each of the four 
research objectives based on all of the tests that addressed them.  Finally, Section 5.10 
summarizes the test results. 
 
5.1. SINGLE ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS 
  Identifying the taggant element is the first step towards being able to calculate the 
concentration.  The results of performing NAA on five samples of five different 
concentrations of the three elements are shown in Table 5.1, which shows the number of 
times the taggant element was detected.  
 
Table 5.1. Number of Completed Tests Where Taggant Element was Detected in Solution 
Element 100 ppb 500 ppb 1000 ppb 2000 ppb 4000 ppb 
Holmium Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 
Samarium Yes – 5/5 Yes* – 4/4 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 
Europium Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 Yes – 5/5 




 The taggant element was identified in all of the completed tests.  One of the 
samarium 500 ppb samples suffered a detector failure during counting, so data was not 
gathered for this sample.  The failure of this detector delayed measurements of the 
remaining 500 ppb samarium samples, as well as all 1,000 ppb, 2,000 ppb, and 4,000 ppb 
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samples, which were all irradiated on the same day, by several days due to the time needed 
for repairs.  This led to a long delay between irradiating and counting samples that partially 
inspired testing in Section 6, and that impacted the quality of the samarium results.  All 
samples were counted for 1 hour. 
 Calculating the concentration depends on identifying the peaks in the NAA 
spectrum that correspond to the taggant elements and determining the number of counts 
under that peak and subtracting the number of counts caused by background noise under 
the peak.  Appendix A presents a fully worked calculation of the concentration by this 
method.  This difference is the net number of counts under a given peak, and is the number 
of counts associated with the taggant element.  The average of the concentrations measured 
in each test is followed by the average uncertainty in the concentration measured, and is 
shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Averaged Measured Concentration and Concentration Uncertainty (in ppb) 
Element 100 ppb 500 ppb 1000 ppb 2000 ppb 4000 ppb 






























 Except for the two lowest concentration holmium solutions, the measured 
concentrations of the taggant elements in solution are much higher than what they should 
be.  These two tests utilized a different HPGe detector than the subsequent tests due to an 
equipment failure.  Figure 5.1 plots the relationship between the measured concentration 
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on the y-axis and the concentration that was prepared by sequential dilution on the x-axis, 
and excludes the two lowest concentration holmium solutions to keep the detector used 
consistent.  The error bars show the standard deviation of the measured concentration of  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Comparison of Added Concentrations of Single Taggant Elements to 




the samples at each nominal concentration. Results for each species individually are 
presented in Appendix C.   
 As shown in Figure 5.1, the measured concentrations that are derived using 
Equation 1 are substantially different from the actual concentration of the solutions.  A 
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of one particular element to produce the lines shown.  This regression shows that the results 
for the europium (green) and holmium (blue) test series are very highly correlated with one 
another, with an R2 value of 0.996 for the europium tests and an R2 value of 0.984 for the 
holmium tests.  The correlation coefficient for the samarium (red) tests is a lower 0.911.  
A high correlation coefficient in a linear regression implies that there exists a constant 
factor that is causing the difference.  The parameters for the linear regression are 
summarized below in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3. Linearity of Measured Concentrations Showing Scale Factor (ratio) between 
Measured Concentration and Added Concentration 
Element Scale Factor R2 value 
Holmium 5.51 0.984 
Samarium 6.63 0.911 




 In Equation 3 there are two factors, in addition to the number of counts, that need 
to be determined by experiment: the neutron flux, which under the test conditions should 
be the thermal neutron flux of the MSTR 𝛷&C, and the probability that the detector will 
count a given emitted gamma photon 𝜀.  The calculated mass of the element, and thus the 
concentration of the element is inversely related to these parameters.   
 The slope given by performing a linear regression shows the magnitude of the 
constant error.  For example, it shows that the error in one or both of these parameters is a 
constant factor of 6.6274 for the samarium samples.  This factor decreases for holmium to 
5.5092 and further decreases for europium to 1.564.  This trend matches the trend with the 
parameter	𝜀, as HPGe detectors are much more efficient for lower energy gamma photons 
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than higher energy gamma photons.  The samarium concentrations are calculated from the 
peak in the spectrum at 69.673 keV, the holmium concentrations from an 80.576 keV peak, 
and the europium concentrations from a 344.29 keV peak.  An error solely in the thermal 
neutron flux parameter would be constant across the different taggant elements. 
 Despite the error in calculating the concentrations, most of the uncertainties in the 
calculated concentration are less than 50 ppb.  Therefore, utilizing concentration levels 
separated by 100 ppb is feasible under these best-case scenarios for most tests.  Resolving 
the issue with the concentrations is expected to reduce the uncertainties but it is unknown 
if the other uncertainties will be reduced to less than 50 ppb.  Table 5.4 summarizes the 
objectives the single element standard solutions test addresses and whether the test met 
each objective. 
 
Table 5.4. Single Element Standard Solutions Test Objectives Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured? Failed 




5.2. SINGLE ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST 
 The presence or absence of an element in the post-blast residue can be determined 
by the presence or absence of a peak at the characteristic energy corresponding to the 
element.  Any other elements that were present in the post-blast residue did not interfere 
with identifying what, if any, taggant elements were present.  Results for the post-blast 
tests using the different tagged binary charge are shown in Table 5.5 [36]. 
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 For tests one and two, holmium was added to the undetonated explosive.   In both 
of these tests, the net number of counts under the peak is greater than the uncertainty in the 
number of counts, and therefore holmium was found to be present in these tests.    
 
Table 5.5. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties of Holmium and 
Samarium Tagged Binary Post-Blast Residues. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was 
Detected) 
Test Taggant Element 
Added 
Holmium Net Counts 
(80.6 keV peak) 
 
Samarium Net Counts 
(69.6 keV peak) 
 
1 Holmium 2,236 ± 668 290 ± 1,306 
2 Holmium 98,026 ±1,744 - 
3 Samarium 63 ± 1,490 10,872 ± 1,299 
4 Samarium 3,372 ± 1,762 66,381 ± 2,589 




 The results for samarium in these tests are shown as well, and indicate that 
samarium was not found in the first test, and a measurement of the peak in the second test 
was not able to be made due to a technical error where the software used failed to measure 
the area under the peak [36]. 
 For tests three and four, samarium was added to the undetonated explosive.   In 
both of these tests, the number of net counts under the peak is once again larger than the 
uncertainty in the number of counts, indicating that samarium was present in the samples.   
Test three shows no presence of holmium in the sample.  Test four shows a spurious 
holmium presence, as an additional peak near, but not at, the energy corresponding to 
holmium and can be disregarded [36]. 
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 Figure 5.2 shows the NAA spectrum measured from each test between gamma 
energies of 30 keV and 120 keV.  The spectra are scaled to percent of the maximum value 
in the time span so that all of them can be presented on a single chart.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Comparison of NAA Spectra of Post-Blast Residues Containing Holmium 




 The number of net counts listed in Table 5.5 is the net number of counts under the 
peak at 80.6 keV and 69.7 keV for the holmium counts and the samarium counts 
respectively.  The single element standard solutions test series identified these peaks in 
particular to be the most specific for these two elements.  In test 4, the only test where a 

























Test 1 (Ho) Test 2 (Ho) Test 3 (Sm) Test 4 (Sm) Test 5 (none)
41.5	 keV49.1		keV 69.7	 keV80.6		keV 103.1		keV
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The range of energies covered by the 82.5 keV peak in test 4, and the range of energies 
around 80.6 keV from holmium in tests 1 and 2 partially overlap.  When this area is counted 
for the test 4 results, this small peak at 82.5 keV contributes to the counts shown under the 
“Holmium Net Counts”, but is not actually from the presence of holmium.  While the net 
counts for test 4 technically meet the criteria to say that holmium is present, the asterisk in 
the table denotes that holmium was not truly detected. 
 These tests also used the same irradiation parameters as the solution tests in the 
previous subsections.  One change between them though was the addition of a delay period 
between counting and irradiating the samples.  Due to the presence of additional elements 
in the post-blast residue that were not found in the solution based tests, the total activity of 
the irradiated samples was too high to accurately obtain an NAA spectrum.  As a result, a 
48 hour delay time was implemented. The tests are summarized in Table 5.6, and show the 
taggant element, the concentration of the taggant element in the undetonated explosive, 
and the measured concentration of the taggant element in the post-blast residue. 
 
Table 5.6. Single Element Binary Post-Blast Test Undetonated Concentrations and 
Measured Post-Blast Residue Concentrations (in ppb) 




1 Holmium 19,600 5,289 ± 30 
2 Holmium 19,600 79,230 ± 1,410 
3 Samarium 19,700 13,690 ± 560 




 The measured concentrations of taggant elements in these tests is scattered, but 
none of them match the undetonated concentration. Tests 1 and 3 are of the same order of 
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magnitude as the concentration in the undetonated explosive.  Tests 2 and 4 are both very 
far off from the concentration in the undetonated explosive, though in different directions. 
Table 5.7 summarizes the objectives the single element binary post-blast test addresses and 
whether the test met each objective. 
 
Table 5.7. Single Element Binary Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 3: Taggant found above 
Background? Met 
Objective 4: Concentration same in post-




5.3. SINGLE ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST  
 The series of tests performed using a Composition B focused on identifying the 
taggant element holmium, when added to the undetonated explosive, in the post-blast 
residue.  Since post-blast residues contain many elements, the primary concern is 
determining if the taggant elements can be found.  Results for the post-blast tests using a 
tagged composition B charge are shown in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties of Holmium Tagged 
Composition B Post-Blast Residue. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was Detected) 
Test Taggant Element Holmium Net Counts 
1 Holmium 54,523 ± 820 
2 Holmium 5,384 ± 42,206* 
* Denotes that although this test fails the objective criterion used, further analysis shows 






 Test 1 clearly shows the presence of holmium in the post-blast residue.  Test 2 does 
not.  However, on inspecting the NAA spectrum from Test 2, which is shown in Figure 
5.3, there is a clear peak at the 80.6 keV that is expected for holmium.  The additional peak 
around 49 keV is also indicative of holmium, but is not used to definitively identify 
holmium due to other elements having peaks that interfere with this holmium peak.  The 
asterisk in the table denotes that although the number of net counts does not show the 
presence of the taggant element, the spectrum clearly does.  While the software can be 
helpful, it is necessary to make sure that the results are examined closely. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. NAA Spectrum from Test 2 of Single Element Composition B Post-Blast 






 The goal of this series of tests was to determine if the taggant elements can be 
identified in the post-blast residue.  These tests were carried out like the single element 
binary post-blast tests and included a delay time of 48 hours.  These results are shown in 
Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.9. Single Element Composition B Post-Blast Test Undetonated Concentrations 
and Measured Post-Blast Residue Concentrations (in ppb) 
Test Taggant Element Taggant Undetonated 
Concentration 
Measured Post-Blast 
Residue Concentration  
1 Holmium 14,300 29,970,000 ± 3,561,000 




 The concentration of the taggant element is higher in the post-blast residue than in 
the undetonated explosive.  Combing these results and the results from the single element  
of the explosive is converted to gaseous products while some small fraction of the mass of 
binary post blast tests imply that it is unlikely that the concentration of the taggant element 
in the post-blast residue remains the same as in the undetonated explosive, and is instead 
higher in the post-blast residue than the undetonated explosive.  The likely explanation for 
this is that during detonation, some fraction of the undetonated explosive is only partially 
reacted and becomes post-blast residue.  The taggant elements used do not form gaseous 
products, and would remain behind in the solid phase.  This process increases the 
concentration of the taggant elements relative to their concentration in the undetonated 
explosive. 
 The uncertainties in the concentrations here are also extremely high and seem to 
show that, for these tests at least, the uncertainty is too high to use concentration levels 
 
90 
separated by 100 ppb.  Since the measurement is of the mass concentration of the taggant 
element in the post-blast residue, it is necessary to convert the mass that can be calculated 
using Equation 4 to find the concentration.  The markedly higher concentration 
uncertainties are due to the small quantity of post-blast residue recovered as well as how 
close these quantities are to the precision of the balance used for the measurement.  The 
quantity of post-blast residue recovered from these two tests is approximately two orders 
of magnitude smaller than the quantities recovered from the single element binary post-
blast tests.  Table 5.10 summarizes the objectives the single element Composition B post-
blast test addresses and whether the test met each objective. 
 
Table 5.10. Single Element Composition B Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 3: Taggant found above 
Background? Met 
Objective 4: Concentration same in post-




5.4. MULTI-ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS 
 The multi-element standard solutions build on the single element standard solution 
tests by preparing samples that contained all three of the taggant elements in various 
concentrations.  The presence of multiple elements produces more gammas, which could 
create either too much noise or overlapping peaks in the NAA spectrum and prevent 
accurately identifying the individual taggant elements.  Six total combinations of the three 
elements at three different concentrations (500 ppb, 1,000 ppb, and 2,000 ppb) were 
prepared.  For each mixture, five samples were prepared and tested.  The different mixtures 
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that were prepared, the concentrations of the three taggant elements used in each mixture, 
and the number of tests out of five where the elements were detected are shown in Table 
5.11. 
 
Table 5.11. Multi Element Standard Solutions Table; Number of Tests out of Five where 
Taggant Elements in Multi-Element Standard Solutions were Detected. Each 
Combination in Parentheses 
Mixture # Holmium Samarium Europium 
1 500 ppb (5) 1,000 ppb (5) 2,000 ppb (5) 
2 500 ppb (5) 2,000 ppb (5) 1,000 ppb (5) 
3 1,000 ppb (5) 500 ppb (5) 2,000 ppb (5) 
4 1,000 ppb (5) 2,000 ppb (5) 500 ppb (5) 
5 2,000 ppb (5) 500 ppb (5) 1,000 ppb (5) 




 The taggant elements could be identified as separate elements in every test at these 
concentrations.  This experiment indicates that these taggant elements will be able to be 
identified at all the concentration levels of the nuclear barcode.  The multi-element standard 
solution series of tests was able to answer whether or not the three taggant elements would 
interfere with identifying one another.  
 A representative spectrum showing a sample of the low energy peaks created by 
each element is shown in Figure 5.4, which shows that the peaks do not overlap and are 
easily identified.  Five samples of each combination of concentrations were prepared and 
NAA was performed.  The average measured concentrations of the taggant elements in 




Table 5.12. Averaged Measured Concentrations of Multi Element Standard Solutions in 
Parts per Billion. (Abbreviated as Concentration of Holmium: Concentration of 


















































Figure 5.4. NAA Spectrum of a Representative Multi-Element Standard Solution. 
Containing 2000 ppb Holmium, 1000 ppb Samarium, and 500 ppb Europium.  Peaks 





 The same problem appears in these calculations for the concentration as in the 
calculations for the single element standard solution concentrations.  As such, the 
calculated concentrations measured do not match up with the nominal concentrations.  
Plotting the average measured concentration against the nominal concentration produces 
Figure 5.5.  A total of six combinations of the three taggant elements at three different 
concentrations were created and measured.  Therefore, each element is present at each 
concentration twice, and error bars show the standard deviation in the measured 
concentration.   
  
 
Figure 5.5. Comparison of Added Concentrations of Multiple Taggant Elements to 





























 Unlike the single element standard solution concentrations, the results from this 
series of tests are less conclusive about the reason for the measured concentrations being 
much higher than what the concentrations should be.  The parameters for the linear 
regression are summarized below in Table 5.13.  
 
Table 5.13. Linearity of Measured Concentrations showing Scale Factor between 
Measured Concentration and Added Concentration 
Element Scale Factor R2 value 
Holmium 3.29 0.306 
Samarium 2.07 0.597 




 Unlike the single element solution tests, instead of R2 values of at least 0.9, the 
absolute value of the R2 values falls within the range of 0.3 to 0.59.  This range is generally 
considered to be insufficient to say that there exists a correlation.  However, this range of 
correlation coefficients also does not imply the lack of a correlation either. 
 In addition to the R2 values being different from the single element case, the scale 
factor between the measured concentration and the actual concentration is different.  
Notably, these scale factors are closer together than the ones seen with the single element 
case.  The cause for this is uncertain, but would imply the opposite of the single element 
solution tests.  These results imply that there is a constant error factor, possibly in the 
reactor flux.  Table 5.14 summarizes the objectives the multi-element standard solutions 





Table 5.14. Multi-Element Standard Solution Test Objectives Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured? Failed 
Objective 2: Concentration ± 50 ppb? 13/18 Met 5/18 Failed 





5.5. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST 
 As with the single element post-blast tests, the presence and absence of elements 
can be assessed by determining the net number of counts under the peaks, and the 
uncertainties in the net counts, corresponding to that element in the NAA spectrum 
obtained from the sample.  The net counts and the uncertainties for each of the three taggant 
elements used for tests one through six in this series are shown in Table 5.15. 
  
Table 5.15. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element 













1 377.27 ± 172.55 Yes 
744.72 ± 
294.59 Yes 0 No 
2 551.95 ± 273.78 Yes 0 No 0 No 
3 147.09 ± 325.00 No 
2,383.53 ± 
359.49 Yes 0 No 
4 122.32 ± 194.84 No 0 No 0 No 
5 216.11 ± 200.87 Yes 
180.80 ± 
243.56 No 0 No 
6 118.49 ± 148.10 No 
774.50 ± 






 In each of these tests, europium could not be identified.  There are two possible 
reasons for this.  Europium has two stable, naturally occurring isotopes, 151Eu and 153Eu 
[38].  During NAA, these elements produce isotopes that have relatively long half-lives on 
the order of several years.  This long half-life, however, makes these elements relatively 
inactive, and thus they require longer counting times, making their use not feasible for this 
experiment.  Activation also produces the europium isotope 152m1Eu, a metastable isotope 
with a half-life of 9.29 hours [38].  This more active isotope is the one that has been used 
to specifically identify the presence of europium.  The post-blast residue sample from the 
first test in this series began counting 70 hours after irradiation.   This delay was necessary 
to allow safe handling of the samples due to the activity of some shorter lived isotopes 
including manganese, silicon, and aluminum that were picked up from the environment. 
This period of time is approximately 7.5 half-lives, so the amount of the active isotope 
being measured has been reduced by a factor of 27.5, or approximately 1/186th of its original 
concentration.  Therefore, the activated europium allows for a considerably shorter 
counting time, but it may be too unstable to be seen after the required delay period. 
 The second possible reason for the absence of europium in the post-blast samples 
is that none of the added europium taggant was collected.  While the elements added to the 
explosive cannot be destroyed during the detonation process, it could be that the europium 
partitions in the cloud of particulate material generated by the detonating explosive 
differently than holmium and samarium due to either physical characteristics such as 
atomic weight or density, or due to chemical characteristics such as reactivity with the 
detonation products.  This possibility will need further study.  However, since all three 
elements are rare earth elements, they should be chemically similar, which suggests they 
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should act similarly during detonation.  Additionally, rare earths commonly have similar 
physical characteristics as well.   While the data collected cannot discriminate between the 
two possible reasons, we consider it more likely that the time delay between irradiating the 
samples and counting them is responsible for the lack of any measurable quantity of 
europium in the samples. 
 The results for holmium are positive.  All samples showed traces of holmium, 
however tests three, four, and six did not show more net counts than the uncertainty in the 
measurement.  A peak at the correct energy for holmium was observable for each test, 
similar to the results for test two of the single element composition B test series, but the 
measured net counts do not meet our criteria for stating that holmium is present in those 
tests.  
 The results for samarium are mixed.  In two samples, no trace of a samarium peak 
at 69.6 keV was found.  From the single and multi-element standard solutions tests, this 
peak was found to be the most specific peak indicating the presence of samarium, despite 
larger peaks present at 41.5 and 103.1 keV which had other peaks close enough to interfere 
with measurement.  Of the remaining tests, three showed net counts well in excess of the 
uncertainty, and one does not meet that criteria.  The results from test five, like the holmium 
results from tests three, four, and six; have noticeable peaks, but do not meet the criterion 
to say that samarium is present. 
 In the end, this test did not provide a clear answer to determining if the taggant 
elements interfere with one another.  In all the tests where the taggant elements can be 
shown to be present, their peaks are distinct from those from other elements present in the 
sample.  However, due to the presence of other environmental material, the post-blast 
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residue becomes highly active when irradiated under the test conditions, and a period of 
time is needed to allow the samples to “cool” sufficiently so that they can be handled safely.  
This period of time was too long for the 9.29 hour half-life of metastable 152m1Eu isotope.  
More tests will need to be performed in future work to fully evaluate the suitability of 
europium for use in the Nuclear Barcode.  Both holmium and samarium are recommended 
as successful candidates for the Nuclear barcode and with the increased knowledge from 
this study, additional taggant options will be selected with similar half-lives for ease of 
reading the barcode post detonation. 
 As with the single element post-blast tests, a delay time between irradiating and 
counting the samples was added, however this period varied between the different tests in 
this series.  Table 5.16 shows the measured concentrations of the taggant elements in the 
post-blast residue created by the binary charges. 
 
Table 5.16. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Series Concentration and Their 







1 4,544.33 ± 9,305.14 13,487.41 ± 2,7617.31 - 
2 17,080.33 ± 254,950.59 - - 
3 1,567.97 ± 2,494.45 5,072.96 ± 8,070.45 - 
4 3,222.75 ± 29,804.05 - - 
5 n/a n/a n/a 




 It is immediately obvious that these concentrations are inconsistent.  One 
contributor to this might be that concentration uncertainties are all higher than the 
calculated concentrations.  This is mostly because of the uncertainty from the quantity of 
 
99 
post-blast residue that was recovered.  The in all cases, not much post-blast residue was 
recovered, which likely also contributed to the issue with test five where the measured 
mass was less than zero, and no concentrations were calculated for this sample.  These 
concentrations do not match up well to the concentrations of the undetonated explosive 
except for the holmium concentration in test 6 which should be 4,000 ppb and was 
measured at 4,105.55 ppb.  That the uncertainty is eight times larger than the measured 
value makes this result unreliable, however.  
 Additionally, only holmium was detectable in all tests.  Europium was not detected 
in any of the tests that were performed, and samarium was only detected some of the time.  
It is not surprising that europium was not found: almost 7.5 half-lives had elapsed, and 
therefore the activated europium decayed away.  On the other hand, holmium has a half-
life of 26.8 hours, and so some holmium should still be present.  The fact that samarium 
was not detected, despite the longer half-life of the activated samarium isotope used (Sm-
154), of 46 hours makes analysis difficult.  No trace of samarium was found in tests 2 and 
4, even though samarium should be comparatively long lived; it can only be concluded that 
samarium was not present in the post-blast residues from these samples.   Table 5.17 
summarizes the objectives the multi-element binary post-blast test addresses and whether 
the test met each objective. 
 
5.6. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST 
 This series of tests on tagged composition B uses the same combination of three 




Table 5.17. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured? Failed 




Objective 4: Concentration same in post-




was used in the multi-element binary post-blast test series described previously in Section 
5.5.  Comparing the number of net counts to the uncertainty in the net counts provides a 
good method of identifying if the taggant element is present in the sample.  These are 
presented below in Table 5.18. 
 
Table 5.18. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element 













1 91.107 ± 236.34 No 
124.90 ± 
211.64 No 0 No 





3 99.40 ± 351.30 No 
445.28 ± 
183.78 Yes 0 No 





5 0 No 223.20 ± 159.70 Yes 0 No 
6 91.66 ± 96.99 No 
537.86 ± 




 Results are similar to the binary post-blast tests.  Samarium and holmium can be 
found in most tests, while europium cannot be definitively located.  Unlike the tests on 
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binary post-blast samples, europium peaks can be noticed in the spectra of some tests, but 
insufficient counts are available for adequate quantification in others.  The amount of 
europium measured here is small and considered “not detected”.  These samples were 
counted approximately 20 hours sooner than the samples from the mixed element binary 
post-blast test series.  This additional data supports the hypothesis that the problem locating 
europium is radioactive decay.   
 The peaks of the three taggant elements are all well separated from the peaks 
coming from other elements present in the sample.  However, not all samples showed peaks 
for all three taggant elements.  This partially addresses the objective of determining if the 
taggant elements interfere with one another or are lost in the background.  Taggant peaks 
are located at distinct energies from the background, but the peaks can be lost due to the 
time needed to allow the samples to be handled after activation.    
 The same six mixtures of the three taggant elements were added to composition B 
charges prepared the same way as in the single element tests.  All other parameters of the 
test were identical between this test series and the previous test series.  The measured 
concentrations are presented in Table 5.19. 
 
Table 5.19. Multi-Element Composition B Post-Blast Series Concentration and 
Uncertainties (in ppb) 
Test Holmium Concentration Samarium Concentration Europium Concentration 
1 5,593.31 ± 154,939.27 9,413.34 ± 260,757.29 - 
2 1,245.23 ± 123.14 3,744.33 ± 379.27 656.19 ± 64.91 
3 765.29 ± 274.40 4,097.66 ± 1,469.27 - 
4 845.15 ± 24.42 4,154.91 ± 119.79 654.98 ± 20.70 
5 - 6,530.26 ± 5,496.39 - 





 The measured concentrations from this series of tests, like the binary tests in Table 
5.16, are mixed.  This implies that the results are not directly dependent on the type of 
explosive used.  The concentrations measured from the post-blast residue are not close to 
the prepared concentrations of the tagged charges.  The uncertainties in the concentrations 
are generally better than expected, in general being at least the same magnitude of the 
concentration, and often better.  The exception is test one.  Test one was the lightest sample, 
weighing one order of magnitude less than the other samples. This shows the effect that 
the collected mass of post-blast residue has on the measured concentration uncertainties of 
the taggant elements.  Recovering more of the post-blast residue will lead to lower 
uncertainties in the measured concentrations. 
 This series of tests behaves more sensibly than the binary ones.  Samarium is always 
detected, holmium sometimes, and europium less frequently.  This follows the relationship 
between the half-lives of the isotopes used to measure the presence of these elements.  
Additionally, the delay between irradiating and counting these samples was shorter than 
the previous test series by 20 hours, for a time delay of approximately 48 hours.  These 
tests also have smaller uncertainties in the concentration than the previous test series, 
excluding test one which has high uncertainty because less post-blast residue was collected.  
Table 5.20 summarizes the objectives the multi-element Composition B post-blast test 
addresses and whether the test met each objective. 
 
5.7. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY REPEATABILITY 
 Variation between samples is expected, so by using identical charges, information 
about the repeatability of the nuclear barcode can be obtained.  This series of tests can 
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Table 5.20. Multi-Element Composition B Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured? Failed 




Objective 4: Concentration same in post-




provide additional information about the recoverability of the individual elements.  Like 
previous tests, comparing the net counts to the uncertainty in the net counts is a 
straightforward test for the presence of the taggant elements.  These data are shown in 
Table 5.21. 
  
Table 5.21. Taggant Elements Present, Net counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element 










































 There were three instances where an element was not found in the post-blast 
residue: europium in the second test, and both holmium and europium in the fourth test.   
The advantage of this series of tests is the same concentrations of taggant elements were 
 
104 
added to undetonated explosive. Despite the noisy environment produced during 
detonation and seen in NAA, the taggant elements could be identified in 12 of 15 cases in 
this series of tests.  An example of the NAA spectrum of a post-blast residue sample is 
included in Figure 5.6. 
 Additional elements in the sample produce their own gammas and due to scattering 
and reflection produce extra background in the NAA spectrum.  This is a normal process 
and happens with all samples that undergo NAA, however searching for trace elements 
such as the taggant elements used in the nuclear barcode exacerbates the issue.  This 
process of losing energy produces a broad spectrum of photons from the narrow peaks 
emitted by a radioactive species, and multiple species all increase this broad spectrum 
noise.  There were three occasions where the taggant elements could not be positively 
identified because the number of net counts was lower than the uncertainty: holmium in 
test 4, and europium in tests 2 and 4.  In those cases, the peak was not present. 
 A key component to the workings of the Nuclear Barcode is the repeatability of the 
measurement of the taggant.  Measurements of the same batch of explosive must all 
produce the same results.  The concentrations for each element across each of the five 
samples should be the same, since the charges were prepared identically.  The measured 
concentrations for each of the five charges, as well as the average across all five 
measurements, are shown in Table 5.22. 
 Uniquely among all of the post-blast tests performed, all three taggant elements 
were detected in every test.  This test series required a delay of 48 hours between irradiating 
and counting the samples of these post-blast tests for the samples to become sufficiently 




Figure 5.6. Example NAA Spectrum of Post-Blast Residue. (note: This is a Zoomed in 
Figure and Cuts off a Peak at Approximately 5 keV Reaching 90,000 Counts and the 
Peak in the Center at 1293 keV Reaching 10,000 Counts to Show more of the Peaks 




Table 5.22. Multi-Element Binary Repeatability Post-Blast Series Concentrations and 







1 1,869.02 ± 686.62 7,331.87 ± 1,572.70 3,703.48 ± 1,996.12 
2 7,304.70 ± 3,147.48 6,315.29 ± 2,624.15 8,239.27 ± 10,545.35 
3 16,696.67 ± 1,382.48 8,536.70 ± 1,663.18 3,255.58 ± 2,850.56 
4 747.11 ± 2,053.52 7,057.98 ± 1,043.17 1,488.50 ± 2,010.25 
5 697.99 ± 446.10 3,949.62 ± 569.37 1,322.72 ± 900.633 























elements were able to be obtained.  Looking first at the average concentrations, the 
measured concentrations are off, but at least of the correct order of magnitude.  The 
uncertainties are high, with holmium and samarium having very similar average 
uncertainties, and europium having an uncertainty nearly identical to the measured 
concentration.   
 Going through the tests individually provides some additional information.  
Europium has two pairs of measurements that are close to one another in tests 1 and 3 as 
well as tests 4 and 5.  Test 2 however, shows much higher amounts of europium than any 
of the previous tests, and also has the highest uncertainty by far.  Samarium is more 
consistent, with only test 5 particularly far from any of the others.  Tests 1 through 4 have 
samarium measurements that are the same, taking the uncertainties into account.  Holmium 
has an outlier in test 3, and unpredictable behavior in the other tests.  Why this particular 
sample has so much holmium compared to the other ones is unknown.  
 For these tests, the uncertainty is predominantly a function of the quantity of post-
blast residue recovered.  The concentration of the taggant element is measured by dividing 
the mass of the taggant element calculated using Equation 3 by this mass, and multiplying 
by 109 to give parts per billion.  When the mass of the post-blast residue is small, the 
uncertainty then becomes a larger fraction of the total mass, and thus contributes more than 
under other circumstances. 






Figure 5.7. Repeatability of Measured Concentration of the Three Taggant Elements 
across Five Tests and Their Uncertainties.  All Measured Concentrations should be the 
same for each Element 
 
 
 The measured concentrations and their uncertainties vary depending on the test.  
This suggests that using the nuclear barcode in the field will require obtaining multiple 
samples to read it.  The concentrations for each element across each sample should be the 
same, since the charges were prepared identically. 
 The concentrations of the taggant elements can be determined.  However, these 
concentrations are suspect due to the issue shown with both the single element standard 
solution series and the multi-element standard solution series.  The calculated 




























Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5
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the undetonated explosive.  Table 5.23 summarizes the objectives the multi-element binary 
post-blast repeatability test addresses and whether the test met each objective. 
 
Table 5.23. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Repeatability Test Objectives Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured? Failed 
Objective 2: Concentration ± 50 ppb? Failed 




Objective 4: Concentration same in post-




5.8. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B REPEATABILITY 
 This series of tests used the same concentrations of each of the three taggant 
elements that were used in the previous section.  To show the detectability of these 
elements, the net counts and the uncertainties in the net counts that were obtained from the 
post-blast residues from this series of tests are shown below in Table 5.24. 
 
Table 5.24. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element 














1 197.37 ± 97.90 Yes 
30.65 ± 
631.94 No 0 No 
2 0 No 328.98 ± 155.69 Yes 0 No 
3 231.31 ± 217.42 Yes 
110.01 ± 
156.95 No 0 No 
4 165.45 ± 207.91 No 
126.14 ± 
89.52 Yes 0 No 
5 138.68 ± 161.62 No 0 No 0 No 
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 Peaks corresponding to holmium and samarium can be seen in all but one test each, 
however these elements can only be definitively said to be present in a couple tests.   
Holmium can only be said to be present in tests one and three, while samarium can only be 
said to be present in tests two and four.   Once again, the time between irradiation and 
counting appears to have allowed for any activated europium to decay away.  The 
composition B repeatability post-blast residue tests had a roughly 12.5% higher delay time 
(54 hours vs. 48 hours) between irradiating the sample and counting them compared to the 
binary repeatability post-blast residue tests.  This additional time could account for the 
difference in the detectability of europium in the two test series. 
 The taggant element peaks can be readily distinguished from peaks resulting from 
other background elements present in the sample.  However, not all samples showed 
notable peaks for the taggant elements.  Taking additional samples of the post-blast residue 
would provide additional data points to determine if the elements are truly not present in 
the post-blast residue for those tests, or if they were not identifiable in that particular sample 
of the post-blast residue. 
 This series of tests, like the previous series of multi-element binary repeatability 
post-blast series, added the same concentration of taggant elements to the explosive charges 
used.  This should allow for a test of the repeatability of this experiment.  The calculated 
uncertainty in the measured concentration of the taggant elements does not fall within the 
50 ppb needed to have concentration levels separated by 100 ppb as the nuclear barcode is 
designed for.  The measured concentrations of each taggant element and the averaged 




Table 5.25. Multi-Element Composition B Repeatability Post-Blast Series Concentrations 
and Uncertainties (in ppb) 
Test Holmium Concentration Samarium Concentration Europium 
Concentration 
1 11,789.27 ± 23,000.32 2,062.15 ± 4,023.16 - 
2 - 1,546.49 ± 13.56 - 
3 14,216.78 ± 30,461.49 7,836.76 ± 16,890.60 - 
4 20,793.77 ± 206,284.12 18,620.15 ± 184,720.76 - 
5 5,117.26 ± 4,659.43 - - 




 This test series required a delay time of 54 hours for the samples to decay enough 
to be safely measured.  As a result, sufficient time elapsed for the activated europium to 
decay.  An additional difference between these tests and the tests involving binary 
explosives is that the quantity of post-blast residue collected from the Composition B tests 
is much lower.  As a result, the effects of the uncertainty in the measurement of the quantity 
of post-blast residue begin to dominate the calculation for the total uncertainty in the 
measured concentration of the taggant elements. 
 The measured concentrations of both holmium and samarium are not close to the 
quantity that were added to the explosive charges.  The measured quantities are incorrect 
by a similar factor (5x for holmium vs. 6x for samarium).  This seems to be more of a 
coincidence based on the size of the uncertainties.  In tests 1, 3, and 4 where both elements 
were detected, the uncertainty in the concentration is larger than the measured 
concentration.  This indicates that these measurements are unreliable. 
 The concentrations of holmium and samarium found in the samples from this test 
are included in Figure 5.8. Note that in an ideal case, the concentrations across each test 
would be the same. 
 
111 
 The uncertainty in the measured concentration for the fourth sample is this series 
of tests is cut off to better show the measurements of the concentrations.  Europium 
concentrations are not included in this figure because no europium peaks were found during 
testing.  The shown concentrations are not similar to one another.  Additionally, the 
uncertainties in each test are much larger than the necessary 50 ppb.  Obtaining multiple 
samples, and acquiring large individual samples of the post-blast residue should increase 
the accuracy of the concentration measurement of the post-blast residue and reduce the 
magnitude of the uncertainty of the measured concentration. 
 As with previous samples, the taggant element peaks can be readily distinguished 
from peaks resulting from other background elements present in the sample.  However, not 
all samples showed notable peaks for the taggant elements.  Taking additional samples of 
the post-blast residue would provide additional data points to determine if the elements are 
truly not present in the post-blast residue for those tests, or if they were not identifiable in 
that particular sample of the post-blast residue. 
 These concentrations do not match the concentrations of the taggant elements that 
were present in the undetonated explosive.  Additionally, there is still the unresolved 
difficulty with calculating the concentrations of the elements that was initially shown in 
the first series of single element standard solutions.  Once this error is resolved, a better 
determination of the accuracy of these results should be possible.  Table 5.26 summarizes 
the objectives the multi-element Composition B post-blast repeatability test addresses and 





Figure 5.8. Repeatability of Measured Concentration of the Two Detected Elements 
across Five Tests and Their Uncertainties.  Each Concentration Should be the Same.  
Europium was used as a Taggant, but was not Detected in any of the Samples, so it was 




Table 5.26. Multi-Element Composition B Post-Blast Repeatability Test Objectives 
Summary 
Objective Objective met or failed 
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured? Failed 
Objective 2: Concentration ± 50 ppb? Failed 




Objective 4: Concentration same in post-
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5.9. EVALUATION OF POST-BLAST SURVIVABILITY OBJECTIVES 
 The objective of this research has been to evaluate the survivability of the Nuclear 
Barcode identification taggant concept.  To evaluate this property, the concept of 
survivability was broken down into a series of four objectives that the Nuclear Barcode 
must satisfy in order to meet the definition of a survivable taggant. These four objectives 
then informed the design of a series of eight experiments.  
 
1. Determine if the taggant elements can be detected and quantified via NAA at the 
desired concentrations. 
 
2. Determine if the different concentration levels of the taggant elements can be 
distinguished via NAA with sufficient precision that the measured concentration 
lies within only one concentration level (50 ppb precision to use the Nuclear 
Barcode as designed). 
 
3. Determine the distinguishability of the taggant elements from the background, such 
as other taggant elements and other common elements in the environment such as 
sodium, potassium, chlorine, etc. 
 
4. Identify concentrations of the taggant elements in the post blast residues and verify 




5.9.1. Research Objective One.  The results of the experiments described in the 
previous sections show that NAA performs well in identifying the presence or absence of 
three taggant elements: holmium, samarium, and europium.  The technique is sound, and 
is now considered a reference technique for the measurement of composition of a material 
[7].  The current results for using the technique on the equipment at the MSTR are more 
mixed.   
 Currently, the concentrations of solutions of taggant elements dissolved in water 
cannot be correctly measured.  However, these results show high correlation coefficients 
for single element solutions that are greater than 0.9.  This indicates that for these solutions, 
there is a systematic reason.  Calculating the concentration uses Equation 3.  Two 
components of this equation are not experimental parameters and need to be determined 
by other experiments.  The first component, the thermal flux 𝛷&C, is not likely to be the 
cause of the disparity.  If an error in the thermal flux were the cause of this disparity, then 
the magnitude of this disparity would be the same for each element that was measured.  
However, the measured disparity is not constant.  In fact, the measured disparity decreases 
as the peak energy increases.  This is what would be expected if this disparity were caused 
by an error in determining the probability that a photon released by the sample interacts 
with the detector.   
 This factor, 𝜀, is a function of the energy of the incident photon and decreases as 
the energy of the incident photon increases.  For the multi-element solutions, the correlation 
coefficient is notably smaller.  This indicates that the results for the multi-element standard 
solution test series does not support or go against the possible causes shown by the single 
element test series.  It is possible that both factors are incorrect; the results from the single 
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element standard solutions and multi-element standard solutions do not rule out this 
possibility.  Currently, it is possible to detect the presence of the taggant elements, but it is 
not possible to correctly measure the concentration of the taggant elements. 
5.9.2. Research Objective Two.  The issue from objective one with accurately  
determining the concentration of elements using NAA prevents any solid conclusions from 
being drawn about the ability of the technique to resolve the concentration levels necessary 
for the nuclear barcode to work.  However, one conclusion that can be drawn from the 
results is that obtaining many samples will produce a better measurement than only 
obtaining one.  For the nuclear barcode, this means that the post-blast residue should be 
sampled from as many different locations as possible in order to accurately determine the 
concentrations.  The resolved concentrations for some tests hint that if the concentrations 
can be accurately resolved, then NAA will be able to determine the different concentration 
levels to the necessary degree of precision.  The uncertainty in the measured concentration 
for the single element solutions, which represents the best case scenario for these 
measurements, is less than 100 ppb for 11 out of the 15 combinations of the three elements 
at 5 concentrations.  However, until this issue with correctly measuring the concentrations 
is resolved, no conclusion can be accurately reached. 
5.9.3. Research Objective Three.  It was initially proposed that measurements of 
the concentration of taggant elements would be taken from materials that might be present 
in a post-detonation environment.  This was proposed to ensure that the presence of the 
taggant element and the concentration of the taggant element that was measured using 
NAA would result only from the actual taggant, and not be from a naturally occurring 
source.  Initial tests on both binary and composition B explosives that were tagged with a 
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single element showed no sign of the proposed taggant elements in the post-detonation 
environment.  Thus, this proposed series of tests was considered to be unnecessary since 
performing NAA on the post-blast residue would collect the same information.  In no tests 
were the taggant elements interfering with reading one another, nor was there any 
interference from peaks caused by an element present in the environment.  The “noise” 
caused by the presence of other peaks might be responsible for some of the measured 
uncertainty in the concentrations, since this would increase the amount of background noise 
and decrease the prominence of any peaks.  Additionally, detector dead time is a factor to 
consider as well, and a higher amount of other active isotopes will increase this dead time.  
This dead time arises from the limit of the detector in counting and determining the energy 
of many gammas simultaneously and is an inherent limit of the detector. 
5.9.4. Research Objective Four.  Despite the issue preventing accurate calculation 
of the concentration of the taggant elements, it is likely the case that the concentration of 
the taggant elements in the post-blast residue does not match the concentration of the 
elements in the undetonated explosive.  This is reasonable, since only a fraction of the mass 
of the undetonated explosive ends up being deposited as post-blast residue.  An altered 
version of objective four then becomes “determine if the concentrations of the taggant 
elements in the post-blast residue are a predictable function of the concentrations of the 
taggant elements in the undetonated explosive”.  This altered objective requires that the 
concentrations of the taggant elements in the post-blast residue be accurately measured, 
which has not yet been demonstrated.  
 In many tests, the taggant elements have been able to be identified in the post-blast 
residues.  However, in some of the tests, the taggant elements have not been able to be 
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identified in the post-blast residues.  A key parameter, then, is the delay between when the 
sample is irradiated and when the sample is counted.  This delay is necessary for the post-
blast residue containing samples as the detonation results in the deposition of other 
elements onto the witness plates.  Some of these elements become highly active after the 
ten minute irradiation used, and become too active to safely handle the sample.  This delay 
allows for the samples to decay to a safer level of activity.  The delay time requirement 
was especially problematic for measurements of the comparatively short lived europium-
151m1 isotope.  As a result, europium was rarely measured in the post-blast residue, despite 
providing the best results in solutions.  An analysis of the effect of this delay time on the 
measured concentration and the uncertainty in the concentration measurement is presented 
in Section 6. 
 These tests also observed much higher uncertainties in the calculated 
concentrations that results from the low mass of post-blast residue that is collected.  
Quantities of post-blast residue from the binary tests were approximately two orders of 
magnitude larger than the amount of post-blast residue recovered from the tests using 
Comp B.  Lower uncertainties would be achieved when larger quantities of post-blast 
residue have been obtained.  This is another result in favor of requiring many samples of 
post-blast residue in order to use the nuclear barcode as an identification taggant for 
explosives.  Multiple samples would permit averaging of the concentration of taggants 
based on the total weight of post-blast residue recovered, which in theory could reduce the 
contribution to uncertainty from the mass of post-blast residue.  The low quantity of post-
blast residue recovered also means that correspondingly small amounts of taggant elements 
are recovered, which may not be found due to being overwhelmed by background noise.  
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The low quantity of post-blast residue recovered certainly did not help when trying to 
identify the presence of the short lived europium-152m1 isotope in many samples. 
 
5.10. SECTION SUMMARY 
 While performing the series of tests described in this section to evaluate the 
survivability of the Nuclear Barcode in the post-blast residue, the critical parameters for 
performing NAA were identified.  A total of five key parameters that can be controlled 
experimentally were identified.  Each must be optimized to fully evaluate the performance 
of NAA in this application in determining the concentration of the taggant elements.  The 
parameters are listed in Table 5.27, and use the notation for each variable from Equation 
3.  
 
Table 5.27. Five Key Parameters for Optimizing NAA 




 The effect of the delay time 𝑡K on the measured concentration and the uncertainty 
in the measured was selected for further study.  This parameter varied the most across and 
within each test series.  In the middle of testing the second of the five replicate samples of 
the 500 ppb solution of samarium (described in Section 5.1), the detector being used failed, 
and was not repaired for several days.  This led to measurements of the remaining replicates 
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being delayed, and they produced the highest measured uncertainty of any of the tested 
solutions containing samarium.  In comparison, holmium and europium tests, as well as 
samarium tests excluding the 500 ppb samples, showed a trend of increased uncertainty 
with increased concentrations.   
 Additionally, the variable delay time between irradiating and counting the samples 
is the most likely cause of the inability to detect europium in almost all of the post-blast 
residue samples.  Since the presence of europium is indicated by measuring a greater 
number of net counts than the uncertainty in the measurement of the number of net counts, 
the delay time might have an effect.  The uncertainty in the mass and therefore 
concentration of the taggant elements is also dependent on this relationship and should be 
evaluated as well. 
 Finally, the delay time was permitted to vary so that samples could be handled 
safely after being irradiated.  The length of time where the sample was too active to 
measure varied from sample to sample, and detector availability also played a role in this.  
For these three reasons, an additional series of tests on the effect of delay time on measured 





6. DELAY TIME EFFECTS ON UNCERTAINTY 
 The delay time between irradiating and counting the sample was shown to be a key 
determining factor in identifying the presence or absence of elements, as well as possibly 
having an effect on the measured concentration or the uncertainty of the concentration 
measurement.  Based on these prior results, a series of experiments was performed to 
evaluate the effect of the delay time on the measured concentration and the uncertainty.  
To truly optimize NAA, the experimenter must optimize five of the quantities in Equation 





6.1. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
 Five identical samples of 1,000 ppb holmium solution were prepared at the same 
time by successive dilution.  The samples were placed into plastic vials and transferred by 
the unshielded pneumatic or “rabbit” system to the core of the MSTR for 10 minutes when 
operating at 200 kW.  The samples were then retrieved using the same pneumatic system 
and removed from the plastic vial once it was safe.  Although these are the same power 
and irradiation time parameters that were used for the tests in Section 5, the reactor core 
configuration was changed between the end of the testing in Section 5 and the beginning 
of the testing in Section 6.  The reactor core configuration is the specific arrangement of 
fuel rods, control rods, and other components in the reactor core.  Changing the core 
configuration could change the flux profile, and would make direct comparisons of the 
 𝑚 = 𝐶 𝜆((1 − 𝑒/;&<)𝑒/;&>(1 − 𝑒/;&?) ∗ 𝑀(𝛷&C𝜎DFF𝛤𝜀𝜃𝑁J  
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measured concentrations incorrect since the new flux profile was not known.  These 
samples were then counted 5 times for one hour each time over a 96 hour period.  The 
sample was counted 10 minutes after being irradiated, and the sample was also counted at 
24 hour intervals after irradiation to observe the effect on the delay between irradiating and 
counting the sample on the measured concentration.  The detector used was an HPGe 
detector operated at a voltage of 4500 V, and measurements were recorded using 
Canberra’s ProSpect software.  
 The method for calculating the concentration of holmium in the samples used 
Equation 3 from Section 2.2, the same as the tests in Section 5.  The uncertainties in the 
measured concentration were calculated in the same way as tests in Section 5 as well.  
Uncertainties in the measured concentrations were derived by summing the partial 
derivative of Equation 3 with respect to each variable, multiplied by the uncertainty in that 
variable in quadrature to yield the uncertainty in the mass of the taggant element.  The same 
method for estimating the uncertainty was used for the equation to calculate the mass 
concentration of the taggant element. Specifically, this means that the presented 
uncertainties are not the same as the standard deviation in measured concentration.  The 
calculated uncertainties presented here give the minimum uncertainty in concentration that 
can be obtained, while taking all variables into account.  This analysis was used on the raw 
spectrum obtained by NAA for each of the samples of the test series. 
 Holmium was used because it is a monoisotopic element, and prior experience has 
shown that it produces only a few distinct gammas.  This simplifies the subsequent analysis 
and should mean that any observed effects are directly a result of the imposed delay time.  
Holmium was dissolved in DI water to provide a clean background to identify the peaks.  
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Another benefit of using holmium is that the half-life of the activated holmium is 26.8 
hours, close to the 24 hour delay between irradiations.  A 24 hour delay was used due to 
scheduling and access limitations to the detector and reactor facilities at the MSTR.  
Therefore, each of the 24 hour periods was approximately one half-life.   
 
6.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 The measured concentrations of each sample across each of the five measurements 
are shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Delay Time Measured Concentrations (in ppb) of 1000 ppb Holmium 





































Delay between measuring and counting (in half-lives of Ho-166)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5
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 The samples were prepared with the same concentration.  Sample 2 was measured 
10 minutes earlier than all the other samples, due to experimenter error.  This time 
difference is much shorter than both the 24 hour period between measurements and also 
the 28.6 hour half-life of activated holmium-166.  Therefore, despite this difference in 
when sample 2 was measured compared to the others, any errors from this should be 
negligible, and sample 2’s measured concentrations can be directly compared to the other 
samples.  Samples 2 through 5 are all consistent with one another, having a measured 
concentration between 2,100 ppb and 2,700 ppb.  Sample 1 appears to be an outlier, as it 
consistently has a lower concentration than any of the other samples after one day had 
elapsed, despite the fact that all samples were prepared in such a manner that their 
concentrations should be identical.  On average, these five samples have a measured 
concentration of holmium of 2,247 ppb, compared to 5,538 ppb from the previous 1,000 
ppb holmium solutions.  Since the detector and measurement methodology remained the 
same, while the reactor configuration changed, the change in measured concentration must 
come from the contribution from flux.  This result supports the explanation that both the 
thermal neutron flux parameter and the detector efficiency parameter are contributing to 
the discrepancy in the measured concentrations seen in the previous section.  There is no 
consistent trend in the measured concentration as a function of the time delay across these 
samples, as expected from the delay term that accounts for time in Equation 3.   
 The previous test results indicate that there might be some component to 
uncertainty as a function of delay time, particularly the notably higher uncertainty found 
in the 1,000 ppb samarium test.  Uncertainty results are shown in Figure 6.2.  Figure 6.2 
shows a trend in the uncertainty in the concentration measurement as a function of delay 
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time.  Somewhere between 2.5 and 3 half-lives after irradiating the samples, the uncertainty 
increased beyond its value when measured immediately after irradiating with no time 
delay.   
 




 Sodium was the only other element found in solution other than holmium, in the 
form of Na-24.  It is suspected that the presence of sodium-24 is what is responsible for the 
noticeable dip in uncertainty for samples 1 and 3 after approximately one half-life.  The 
activated sodium also produces gammas while it decays, like holmium, which produces 
additional background noise.  Since Na-24 has a half-life of 14.99 hours compared to the 
28.6 hour half-life of Ho-166, more sodium will decay than holmium in the given time 

























Delay between measuring and counting (in half-lives of Ho-166)
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compared to the quantity of gammas produced by holmium that is of interest, which would 
produce lower uncertainties in the measured holmium concentration.  If the contaminant 
isotope has a longer half-life than the isotope being measured, this would not occur, and 
measurements should be made as soon as possible. 
 The shape of the uncertainty curve appears to change over time.  At low delay times, 
below the critical 2.5 to 3 half-lives value, the uncertainty appears to increase at the same 
rate with an average increase of 3.9 ppb from just under 1 half-life to over 1.5 half-lives 
and 4.8 ppb from over 1.5 half-lives to just over 2.5 half-lives.  At delay times above 2.5 
half-lives, the slope increases to an average of 10.4 ppb.  The method used to calculate the 
uncertainty in the concentration sums the product of the derivative of Equation 3 with 
respect to a variable and the uncertainty in that variable in quadrature.  The different slopes 
imply that above approximately 2.5 half-lives, the delay time component of this calculation 
dominates the results, whereas below this time, another or multiple parameters from 
equation 3 dominate the result for this particular test.   
 
6.3. SECTION SUMMARY   
 The need for a delay between irradiating and measuring the samples due to 
scheduling constraints led to unexpected results while evaluating objectives 1 through 4.  
The uncertainty of the sample with the longest delay time was approximately double that 
of the next highest uncertainty measurement.  It was found that the uncertainty increases 
as the concentration of the solution increases from 1,000 ppb to 4,000 ppb.  However, the 
highest uncertainty was found with 1,000 ppb solutions of samarium.  This uncertainty is 
also approximately 6 times that of the uncertainty measured in 1,000 ppb holmium which 
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has a similar error in concentration measurements.  The added delay time raised a question 
of what effect this delay had on both the measured concentration of the taggant elements, 
as well as the uncertainty of the concentration and prompted further testing using holmium 
solutions at 1,000 ppb.  Tests show that there is no noticeable trend in the measured 
concentration as a function of delay time out to 3.5 half-lives for holmium but there was 
for the uncertainly calculation.  This testing supports the hypothesis that an error in the 
thermal neutron flux combined with an error in the detector efficiency is the cause of the 
inaccurate concentration measurements. 
 An increase in the uncertainty of the holmium concentration was observed when 
comparing measurements made immediately after irradiating to measurements made after 
2.5 to 3 half-lives.  The uncertainty increased from a range between 7.8 ppb to 19.7 ppb at 
10 minutes or approximately 0 half-lives after irradiation to a range of 10.8 ppb to 20.8 ppb 
after approximately 2.5 half-lives.  The behavior of the uncertainty in the period between 
0 and 2.5 half-lives is less certain, due to the presence of sodium in the samples.  Sodium 
(14.997 hours) [39] has a shorter half-life than the holmium (28.6 hours) [39] that was 
being measured, and would decay more rapidly.  This effect would reduce the amount of 
noise in the NAA spectrum, and also reduce the comparative uncertainty in measured 
holmium concentration.  In samples where this did not occur, there appears to be an 
increase in the slope of the lines connecting adjacent measurements after approximately 
2.5 to 3 half-lives from an average of 3.9 ppb (from just under 1 half-life to 1.7 half-lives) 
to 10.4 ppb between 2.5 half-lives and 3.5 half-lives.  This means that the relative 
contributions of the factors in the equation used to determine the uncertainty change when 
entering this region.   
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 These results show that after this period of approximately 2.5 half-lives, the 
measured uncertainty in the concentration becomes dominated by the delay time.  
Therefore, to minimize the uncertainty in the concentration for holmium solutions, they 
should be counted within 67 hours of irradiating the samples.  This same 2.5 half-lives 
criteria can be applied to the two other elements that were tested in Section 5.  Europium 
concentrations, specifically Eu-152m1 should be counted within 23 hours and samarium 
concentrations should be counted within 115 hours.   
 Combining the results from the testing in Section 5 with this result, it can be 
concluded that elements with a half-life of below 19.2 hours are unsuitable for use with the 
nuclear barcode.  This eliminates the use of europium from consideration for use with the 
nuclear barcode.  A 19.2 hour half-life means that the expected 48 hour delay time between 
measuring and counting the samples from Section 5 is already greater than 2.5 half-lives.  
As such, even if the element can be identified after this length of time, unlike europium, 
the uncertainty will already start to be dominated by the delay time.  If this occurs, it will 




7.1. TAGGANT SURVIVABILITY 
 Historically, taggants have been investigated as a response to proposed laws which 
are themselves responses to crimes and terrorist actions.  Regrettably, since terrorism is 
inevitable, further legal restrictions on explosives will occur.  Previously, proposed laws 
have required the implementation of identification taggants in explosives.  These would 
provide information that would aid law enforcement in investigating crimes involving these 
explosives.  This idea appears to be attractive and has been proposed for a period of 40 
years [1, 2].  After the next or the subsequent major terrorist attack in the United States, 
this pattern suggests that identification taggants will become required in the United States.  
As such, having a fully developed and characterized identification taggant ready to be 
deployed would prove to be a great advantage when that occurs.  Figure 7.1 shows the 
position of the nuclear barcode on the timeline of explosive legislation and taggant efforts.  
 The Nuclear Barcode is an identification taggant that gets its name from nature of 
the technique of neutron activation analysis.  This nuclear technique has been used in the 
semiconductor industry to analyze the impurities in the ultrapure wafers down to the parts 
per billion level to ensure that they can be used to manufacture the chips modern 
technology relies on [30].  Archeologists use this technique to analyze the composition of 
pottery and match the combinations of trace elements, typically rare earths, to determine 
where the clay that was used came from.  This information can be used to determine ancient 









 These two uses of NAA suggest a good candidate identification taggant for 
explosives: introduce very small, parts per billion level quantities of trace elements during 
manufacture.  Utilizing a unique combination of these elements would create a way of 
tracing manufactured explosives.   
 The nuclear barcode’s performance is compared to the performance of other taggant 
technologies in Table 7.1, which adds the nuclear barcode to Table 2.5 on the same one to 
five scale, with a score of five meaning the taggant technology performs extremely well in 
that category or is incredibly cheap, and a score of one meaning the opposite.  The nuclear 
barcode scores highly across all criteria.  Post-blast residues are produced by every 
 
130 
Table 7.1. Comparison of Different Taggant Technologies with Nuclear Barcode 






[1] 5 5 3 5 4 22 
Chemical 




5 5 4 4 4 22 
Isotopic [2] 
 5 5 5 5 1 21 
Biological 
[2] 3 3 5 5 2 18 
Nuclear 




detonation, and can be collected with a cotton ball, giving the nuclear barcode a high 
recoverability score.  The taggant elements are not destroyed during detonation, giving it a 
high score in the survivability category.  The ability to produce many unique codes gives 
the nuclear barcode its high utility score.  At the low concentrations used, the taggant 
elements that make up the nuclear barcode are compatible with explosives.  And the high 
cost of taggant materials is mitigated by the extremely low concentrations enabled by the 
accuracy of NAA.  In total, the nuclear barcode exceeds, on a design basis, the scores of 
all earlier taggant categories.   
 Testing of aqueous solutions containing three candidate taggant elements  
(holmium, samarium, and europium) as well as post-blast residues of explosives that had 
these elements introduced was performed.  It was found that the mass of the post-blast 
residue that was recovered from tests using Composition B as an explosive was 
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approximately two orders of magnitude less than the quantity of post-blast residue that was 
recovered from tests using binary explosive.  This testing at the MSTR produced inaccurate 
measurements of the concentrations of the taggant elements.  The sources of this 
inaccuracy were reduced to five possible NAA parameters: the neutron flux that the 
samples are exposed to; the efficiency of the detector used; the length of time the sample 
is irradiated; the length of time the sample is counted; and the delay time, the length of 
time between the irradiation and counting of the sample. 
 This prompted an experiment to be carried out on the effect of the delay time 
between irradiating and counting the sample on the uncertainty in the measurement.  This 
experiment was performed based on interesting results in the uncertainties that occurred 
when scheduling at the MSTR, equipment malfunction, or the variable time needed for an 
irradiated sample to cool sufficiently to be safely handled caused longer than expected 
delays.  For these experiments it was assumed that although the measurements of the 
absolute concentration and concentration uncertainty were incorrect, any trends in the 
observed measurements were real.  It was further assumed that the magnitude of these 
effects would likely change when correct measurements of the concentration could be 
taken, but they would not disappear.   
 Using these assumptions, it was observed that the uncertainty in the measured 
concentration increases once the delay time exceeds a critical value of approximately 2.5 
or 3 half-lives.  Additionally, the increase in uncertainty as delay time increases appears to 
be constant for most samples from immediately after irradiating until the critical value.  
However, after the critical value, the uncertainty appears to increase faster.  This implies 
that there are two regions in the measured uncertainty: after the critical delay time the 
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measured uncertainty is dominated only by the delay time, whereas before the critical delay 
time, the measured uncertainty is dominated by at least one factor that is not the delay time. 
 
7.2. NUCLEAR BARCODE MATERIALS COSTS 
 The Nuclear Barcode uses low concentrations of taggant elements for two purposes.  
The first is to make the Nuclear Barcode stealthy, or difficult to detect without specialized 
equipment and knowledge.  It is expected that this difficulty will make the Nuclear Barcode 
extremely difficult to fake by most groups.  The second purpose is to reduce the material 
cost.  Rare earth and platinum group metals are used because of their superior properties 
when it comes to NAA, however these metals are also expensive.  Iridium is the most 
expensive metal, with a price of approximately $1,200 per troy ounce in 2018.  This puts 
iridium metal at approximately $40 per gram.  Assuming that the average concentration of 
iridium used in a unique tag is 2,000 ppb, then one gram of iridium could be used to tag 
500 kg of explosives, and would add a cost of $0.08 per kg of explosive, or $0.036 per 
pound.  The other elements used are not nearly expensive, so the major materials cost driver 
of the Nuclear Barcode will be iridium in normal economic circumstances.  This is a small 
increase in the total price, and can be further mitigated by reducing the concentrations of 
relatively expensive metals like iridium, rhenium, and europium, and increasing the 





8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMMENDATIONS 
8.1. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1.1. Taggant Survivability.  The survivability of the Nuclear Barcode was 
assessed by the tests described in Section 4.   The conclusions listed below are directly 
shown by the results presented in Section 5.   
 
• All three taggant elements tested (holmium, samarium, europium) can be 
identified by NAA 
 
• All three taggant elements tested can be identified in aqueous solutions at 
concentrations of 100 ppb and above 
 
• All three taggant elements have distinct peaks that are separated from the 
peaks produced by the other taggant elements 
 
• All three taggant elements have been identified in the post-blast residue. 
 
• Other elements present in the post-blast residue do not interfere with 
identifying the peaks of the three taggant elements or measuring the number 




• Short half-life of europium makes it hard to detect in the post-blast residue 
due to the length of the delay time required to safely handle and measure 
the samples. 
 
• The introduction of the taggants, either as aqueous solutions or solid salts 
did not affect the performance of the explosives which detonated in every 
test.  
 
8.1.2. Delay Time Effects on Uncertainty.  The effects of delay time on the 
uncertainty in the measured concentration were tested in Section 6.  The conclusions listed 
below follow from these results. 
 
• Concentration measurements stay approximately constant. 
 
•  Equation 3 is verified to be accurately compensating for the delay time. 
 
• Uncertainty in the measured concentration increases as delay time 
increases. 
 
• After approximately 2.5 half-lives, the uncertainty in the measured 




• The change in uncertainty in the measured concentration increases as the 
delay time increases. 
 
• Uncertainty in the measured concentration increases faster from 2.5 half-
lives to 3.5 half-lives than at any other times measured. 
 
• The effect of the delay time dominates uncertainty in measured 
concentration after 2.5 half-lives. 
 
8.2. NUCLEAR BARCODE RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This research has shown that explosives tagged with holmium, samarium, and 
europium have some potential for use as an identification taggant.  These elements can be 
detected by NAA in the post-blast residue produced by detonation of the tagged explosive, 
and collected by sampling a piece of material where these detonation products settle.  
Neutron activation analysis is a proven method for analyzing concentrations, but the 
method used in this research is not able to accurately determine the concentrations.  While 
using NAA, it is important to understand the contribution of the delay time to the overall 
uncertainty.  Although it is not always possible due to safety concerns, samples should 
ideally be counted within one half-life of the activated isotopes after irradiation to obtain 
the results with the lowest uncertainty, and to ensure that all of the taggant elements are 
identified, and no later than 2.5 half-lives after irradiating.  Table 8.1 lists the maximum 
delay time corresponding to 2.5 half-lives after irradiating the eight elements identified as 
possible candidates (Eu, Dy, Ho, Lu, Sm, Ir, Re, and Rh), assuming they behave similarly 
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to holmium [27].  Due to the problems observed with detecting the activated form of 
europium in the post-blast residue, any element used in the Nuclear Barcode should have 
a half-life of longer than 10 hours.  It has been observed from the post-blast tests that an 
approximately 48 hour delay is the minimum required to safely handle the samples when 
irradiated under the test conditions used.  This would eliminate any elements that have a 
maximum delay time of less than 48 hours.   
 
Table 8.1. Maximum Delay Time for Candidate Elements 
Element Active Isotope Half-Life Maximum Delay 
Time 
Europium Eu-152m1 9.2 hours 23.1 hours 
Dysprosium Dy-159 144.4 days 361 days 
Holmium Ho-166 26.8 hours 67 hours 
Lutetium Lu-177 6.6 days 16.6 days 
Samarium Sm-153 46.3 hours 115.7 hours 
Iridium Ir-194 19.3 hours 48.2 hours 
Rhenium Re-186 3.7 days 9.3 days 




 As Table 8.1 shows, this eliminates the use of Eu-152m1 and Rh-104, with Ir-194 
falling just beyond this cutoff.  Europium produces other isotopes as well, but these were 
not found during testing of aqueous solutions of europium.  The significantly longer half-
lives of Eu-152 and Eu-154 (13.5 and 8.6 years respectively) would require that the sample 
be measured soon after irradiation for shorter lived isotopes such as holmium and 
samarium, and then would need to be measured again after several weeks or months have 
elapsed to identify the concentration of europium in the sample.  This would drastically 
increase the time required for testing and therefore slow down any criminal investigation.  
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Rhodium produces no other isotopes during irradiation.  Due to their short half-lives, 
europium and rhodium should not be used in the Nuclear Barcode unless that limitation 
can be overcome.    
 Of the remaining six elements, the only concern is the particularly long lived Dy-
159 isotope.  Longer lived isotopes produce fewer gammas per unit of time, and thus would 
require longer counting times.  A solution that might overcome this issue would be to 
perform a 1 hour count as soon as possible to identify the five elements that are not 
eliminated.  After this count, a longer 8, 16, or 24 hour count might yield enough gammas 
from Dy-159 to accurately identify the concentration.  Assuming this is the case, and that 
no other elements are introduced, this reduces the maximum, theoretical, total number of 
unique combinations from 408 to 406.  This results in a total of 4.1 billion potential 
combinations for use with the Nuclear Barcode.   
 Utilizing some assumptions, the utility of the 4.1 billion codes can be estimated.  In 
the US, 3.1 million metric tons of explosives were sold for use in 2014 [6].  Assuming that 
the US represents approximately 20 to 25% of the world explosive market, the global 
production and sale of explosives in one year is 15.5 million metric tons.  Assuming that 
the average size of a batch of explosives is 5000 kg, or just over 10,000 pounds, then for 
an identification taggant scheme that uses a unique code per batch of explosives a total of 
3.1 million unique codes will be used to tag one year of production.  Not all explosive 
products are produced in the same size batch, with specialist products such as boosters or 
dynamite produced in much smaller quantities than ANFO.  To account for these 
variations, it will be assumed that 10 times more codes are required than estimated based 
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on the batch size of 5000 kg, meaning that 31 million unique codes must be used each year.  
At this rate, the 4.1 billion codes produced by the nuclear barcode will last for 132 years  
before having to repeat codes.  This should be a sufficient length of time, as most 







9. FUTURE WORK 
 The research presented here was performed in the greater context of developing an 
identification taggant for explosives that encodes information about the explosive in a 
unique combination of concentrations of several uncommon elements.  The results of this 
research show that while the presence of these elements can be identified in many 
circumstances, it is not currently possible to accurately measure the concentration of the 
three candidate taggant elements at the MSTR.  This must be corrected before any further 
research on a taggant like the Nuclear Barcode is performed. 
 This research suggests two explanations for the inability to measure the 
concentrations.  First, the efficiency of the detector as a function of the energy of the 
incident gamma ray needs to be well characterized.  A factor complicating this 
characterization is that there is a geometric component to this efficiency.  The detector is 
relatively small (2 inch by 2 inch), and therefore only some gammas will be encountered 
by the detector and potentially be measured.  A method to ensure that the geometric 
component is consistent will be needed.  Secondly, more recent tests suggest that the 
reactor flux profile has changed since it was last measured.  Characterizing the reactor flux 
profile can be done using the ASTM E262 standard method.  An alternative method would 
be to perform future irradiations simultaneously with a reference standard.  Once these two 
parameters are determined, it will be possible to determine if the concentration 
measurement problems that this research has encountered are due solely to the 
aforementioned factors, or a product of the Nuclear Barcode taggant method. 
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 In addition to characterizing the detector efficiency and the reactor flux, to truly 
optimize NAA results, it is necessary to optimize the irradiation time, the counting time, 
and the delay time.  This research presents results on the effect of increasing the delay time 
on the uncertainty in the concentration measurement.  The effects of the other four 
parameters must be resolved as well to optimize the effectiveness of NAA. 
 The measured uncertainty in the concentration of the taggant elements was most 
dependent on two factors.  For the single and multi-element standard solutions, 
approximately 80 to 90% of the uncertainty was from the uncertainty in the number of 
counts under the peak used.  Future work to improve this by counting for a longer time, or 
using some other means to reduce this contribution would vastly reduce the uncertainties 
in these measurements.  For post-blast samples, and especially the Composition B post-
blast samples, the mass of post-blast residue recovered was often a significant contribution 
to the measured uncertainty.  In order to calculate the uncertainty of the post-blast samples, 
the mass of the element measured using NAA is calculated using Equation 3.  This mass is 
then divided by the mass of the collected post-blast residue.  The measured uncertainty 
takes the total derivative of this equation with respect to both masses.  Therefore, when the 
mass of the post-blast residue is approximately equal to the minimum that the balance can 
measure, the measured uncertainty becomes completely dominated by the total mass of 
post-blast residue and the uncertainty in the measurement of the mass of post-blast residue 
that is recovered.   
 This work utilized the one group approximation for neutron flux in the derivation 
of Equation 3, and assumed that all neutrons were thermalized in the reactor and reduced 
to low energies.  Future work should include the resonance integral contribution in this 
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derivation, since the resonance integral for the elements holmium, samarium, and europium 
is large, and therefore any intermediate energy neutrons will have a high probability of 
being captured.  Adding this term will reduce the measured concentration of the taggant 
elements in all measurements.  The magnitude of this effect will depend on both the 
resonance integrals of the taggant elements and the intermediate flux of the MSTR.   
 Utilizing taggants on a research scale presented special challenges.  Ways to 
optimally introduce the taggant elements into the explosives and to ensure that they are 
evenly mixed throughout the undetonated explosive need to be investigated.  This research 
introduced the taggant elements as aqueous solutions of sulfate salts into the liquid phase 
of the binary explosive (nitromethane) or to liquid Composition B before casting.  Some 
experiments also introduced the salts directly into either of these two phases.  Regardless 
of how the taggant was introduced, the liquid phase was stirred thoroughly before being 
mixed with the solid phase (in the case of the binary explosive) or cast and allowed to cool 
(in the case of Composition B).  The small quantities of taggants needed to tag the 
explosives at the concentrations desired made it impossible to verify that the salts or 
solutions were evenly mixed throughout the explosive, and it was hoped that any poor 
mixing would be compensated by additional mixing that would occur during detonation.  
Ethanol based solutions containing rare earth elements were tested previously and would 
likely have higher miscibility with the liquid phases, but prior research noted that the use 
of ethanol sensitized tagged explosives [1].   
 Further research will also need to be performed on the effect of the delay time 
between irradiating and counting a sample.  It is assumed that the results presented in this 
accurately show the presence or absence of the different elements by measuring a total 
 
142 
number of net counts greater than the uncertainty in this number.  Tests on solutions of 
holmium show that the ratio of uncertainty to net counts sometimes decreases after a short 
number of half-lives when an element with a shorter half-life than the taggant element is 
present.  This might allow for future variations of the Nuclear Barcode to use lower 
concentrations or have more concentration levels if the effect persists.   
 Further experiments on the delay time and the measured uncertainty should also be 
carried out and extended to longer delay times.  Short delay times showed a critical delay 
time of approximately 2.5 to 3 half-lives was when the uncertainty in the measured 
concentration became dominated by delay time effects.  Assuming this result can be 
reproduced, carrying out tests beyond 4 half-lives would prove useful as the isotope of 
europium used in the post-blast tests had a delay time between 7 and 10 half-lives.  Any 
change of behavior in this range would strengthen the observation made in Section 6 that 
a change in the rate at which the uncertainty in the measured concentration is increasing 
indicates a change in the relative magnitudes of the delay time contribution.  
 Future testing of the Nuclear Barcode should be performed before determining if it 
is a viable identification taggant.  The tests below are ordered based on the current state of 
the Nuclear Barcode and where the most significant improvements can be found, with the 
first five being more important than the final two. 
  
• Calibrate the HPGe detector so that accurate measurements by NAA can be 
obtained. 
 
• Accurately determine the flux profile of the MSTR. 
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• Determine optimal counting time for each taggant element and reduce the 
uncertainty in the number of counts under a peak by an order of magnitude. 
 
• Methods of adding and evenly mixing the taggant with the explosive during 
the manufacturing process. 
 
• Determine feasibility of utilizing longer-lived isotopes such as Eu-152 and 
Dy-159 in the Nuclear Barcode. 
 
• Effect of sample geometry and orientation on measurement of 
concentrations. 
 
• Effect of distance from site of the blast to the sampling area on the measured 
concentration of taggant elements. 
 
 Assuming these extra tests are successful, then the Nuclear Barcode is most likely 
a survivable identification taggant.  Taggants in Explosives and Marking and Rendering 
Inert identified other characteristics in addition to survivability necessary for the 
widespread adoption of identification taggants: recoverability, utility for law enforcement, 
compatibility with explosives, safety in manufacture and use, no effect on explosive 
performance, compatibility with mined products, environmental acceptability, and cost of 
a taggant program.  A future, full evaluation of an identification taggant program should 
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 This appendix provides a detailed, step-by-step calculation of the concentration of 
the taggant elements found in one sample.  All concentrations in the previous sections were 
calculated using this method.  Equation 3, first presented in Section 2.2, describes how to 
calculate the mass of any element found in a sample when performing NAA.  This equation 
was used to determine the mass of the taggant elements used in the course of the 
experiments described in the previous sections: holmium, samarium, and europium.  From 
these masses, concentrations of these taggant elements could then be obtained by dividing 
the mass of the taggant element(s) found by the total mass of the analyzed sample.  
Equation 3 is reproduced below for ease of reference. 
 
 𝑚 = 𝐶 𝜆((1 − 𝑒/;&<)𝑒/;&>(1 − 𝑒/;&?) ∗ 𝑀(𝛷&C𝜎DEF𝛤𝜀𝜃𝑁J  
 
 
 Of the 13 terms used in equation 3 to calculate the mass, two are universal 
constants: 𝑒, the base of the natural logarithm; and 𝑁J, Avogadro’s number, and can be 
obtained from any number of references.  Five of these quantities are constants that depend 
on the element that is being investigated: 𝜆, the decay constant for the activated isotope of 
the element (that is, the isotope of the element that has captured a neutron during 
irradiation, and calculated by dividing ln(2) by the half-life of the isotope in seconds) under 
investigation; 𝑀(, the molecular weight of the nonactivated isotope of the element;	𝜎DEF , 
the probability that a neutron is absorbed by the nucleus of the nonactivated isotope (under 
a one group assumption where it is assumed that all neutrons can be assumed to be 
thermalized, the value used is the thermal capture cross section);	𝛤, the fraction of all 
 
146 
radioactive decays by an activated isotope that produce a gamma ray of the energy being 
investigated; and	𝜃, the natural abundance of the nonactivated isotope of the element (the 
fraction of all atoms of this element that are the specific isotope that’s activation is being 
investigated).  These four values can be obtained from reference sources such as the 
IAEA’s Nuclear Data Service.   
 Three parameters are set by the experimenter: 𝑡" , the time that the sample is 
irradiated; 𝑡L, the time that gamma rays are counted by the detector, and 𝑡K, the delay time 
between irradiating and counting the sample.  The first two time parameters are set in 
advance by the experimenter, the third parameter is often set by scheduling constraints.  
The MSTR takes approximately 60-90 minutes to start up and reach the power used by 
these experiments.  As the irradiation time used is only 10 minutes, and samples are being 
counted for one hour, it is inefficient to start up the reactor to irradiate only one sample, 
and operating the reactor with no sample in it for 50 minutes between samples is not 
practically feasible either.  As a result, several samples were typically irradiated at the same 
time, and then counted over the course of a day or several days.  This resulted in a range 
of delay times used, and prompted an investigation of the effects of the delay time that is 
shown in Section 6. 
 Ten of the thirteen parameters are therefore set by the experimenter or are standard 
values that can be found in references.  The next parameter, 𝐶, is the number of counts in 
the peak at the gamma energy corresponding to the element being investigated that is 
measured by the detector.  Modern detectors are generally made from high purity 
germanium (HPGe) that is cooled by liquid nitrogen.  
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  These detectors are intrinsic semiconductors and when a gamma photon hits the 
detector, it triggers a cascade of physical reactions by electrons that produce a signal that 
can be measured.  This signal can be separated using microprocessors based on the energy 
of the gamma photon that hit the detector.  HPGe detectors are sensitive to photons in the 
range of approximately 10 keV to approximately 3000 keV depending on the exact model 
of detector used.  This energy range is broken down into a number of different ‘channels’ 
or ‘bins’ with a typical number being 16384 unique energies (214).  The second last 
parameter,  𝜀, is the efficiency of the detector.  This efficiency is a measurement of the 
probability that a gamma photon emitted by an activated isotope interacts with the detector 
and produces a signal in the electronics that is then recorded.  The last parameter, 𝛷&C is 
the neutron flux that the sample is exposed to during irradiation.  At the MSTR, this 
parameter was assumed to be the thermal flux produced by the reactor while operating at 
its full, 200 kW power limit.  It is assumed, for the purposes of these calculations, that the 
flux is described only by neutrons that have been thermalized (that is, have a kinetic energy 
between 0 eV and 0.0273 eV) by interacting with the water used to cool the core.  Prior 
measurements by Dr. Castano and others established that the overwhelming proportion of 
the flux produced by the MSTR falls within the range of thermal neutrons.  These last two 
parameters must be determined by experiment before they can be used to calculate the mass 
using NAA. 
 The measured counts from the detector are fed into a software program called 
ProSpect.  One component of this software produces a report which summarizes the 
spectrum and provides counts and uncertainties in the counts for the number of gamma 




Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) 
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.) 
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
 
154 
Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)  
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 Of the ten pages of the report, only two numbers are relevant to calculating the mass 
of the taggant element holmium [the sample was a 0.5 mL sample of 1 ppm holmium 
dissolved in DI water].  They are the total counting time shown in the red box on page 7 
(3753.380 seconds), and the net area under the peak with a centroid at 80.46 keV which is 
the number in the fourth column of the row surrounded by a blue square on page 8 of the 
report (234933.092 ± 979.764 counts).  It should be noted that in reality, it is impossible to 
have a fraction of a count, and therefore there should only be a whole number of counts.  
The fraction of a count arises from the method by which the net area under the peak is 
determined.  First, the total area under the peak is measured by summing the counts for all 
of the channels that are part of the peak.  Then, the average counts of the channels near but 
outside the peak are taken.  These counts are assumed to represent the background, counts 
that arise from reflections or reemissions of gamma photons and do not correspond to any 
particular element.  The average number of counts multiplied by the number of channels 
that make up the peak is then subtracted from the total area under the peak.  This produces 
the net number of counts under a peak, and will almost always result in some fractional 
number of counts.  For most peaks, the number of counts is very high, so rounding the 
counts to the nearest whole number will have no effect.  The values for the parameters used 
to calculate the concentration of holmium in this example are shown in Table A.1 along 







Table A.1.  Holmium mass calculation parameters 
Parameter Value Units Uncertainty in 




These parameters are then inserted into equation 3 from the main body to produce equation 
1.  
 




This calculates a mass of 1.182*10-5 grams of holmium in the sample.  In 0.5 mL of water 









Therefore, the concentration of holmium atoms in the water in parts per billion is equal to: 
 






 The uncertainty in the measured concentration can also be calculated using neutron 
activation analysis, assuming that all of the measurement errors are normally distributed 
and that the uncertainty values, 𝑢"  listed in Table A.1 are acceptable estimates of the 
standard deviation of the measured quantity.  Under these assumptions, the uncertainty in 
the calculated mass, 𝑢L , of the taggant holmium in this sample can be calculated by 
summing the product of the derivative of equation 3 with respect to each variable by the 
uncertainty in the value of each variable in equation 3 in quadrature, which is expressed 
below in equations 4 (reproduced from Section 2) and 4. 
 










 Taking the necessary derivatives and inserting the correct values into equation 6 
gives a calculated uncertainty in the mass of the taggant of 4.93*10-9 grams.  The 
uncertainty in the concentration of the taggant element can be calculated using the same 
method.  The derivative of each component of the equation is multiplied by the uncertainty 
in the measurements, and then summed in quadrature.  Performing this calculation 
produces an uncertainty in the concentration measurement equal to 10.79 ppb.  This process 
was carried out for each test where concentrations were determined. 
 Of these parameters, many remain the same across all the elements tested.  The 
individual parameters that change when Equation 3 is used to calculate concentrations of 
samarium and europium are shown below in Table A.2, along with the corresponding 
values for holmium.  The listed value for the parameter 𝜃 is the natural abundance of the 
isotope Eu-151 (0.5219)  multiplied by the probability that an atom of Eu-151 becomes the 
metastable isotope Eu-152m1 (0.3176712) when it captures a neutron during irradiation. 
 
Table A.2 Comparison of variable parameters in Equation 3 when used with various 
elements 


























 The procedure used to calculate the efficiency of the detector used for the three key 
energies corresponding to samarium, holmium, and europium is described here.  A NIST 
traceable, multi-element standard is available at the reactor manufactured by Eckert and 
Ziegler (certificate of calibration 91818).  The standard consisted of a 3 mm thick disk of 
material suspended half way up a 20 mm diameter by 2 inch long plastic NAA vial.  This 
standard was then placed in the middle of the same HPGe detector used in Section 5 and 
6, and counted for 1 hour using Canberra’s ProSpect software to collect the data.  Any 
identifiable peaks were measured, and the net counts per second of these peaks were 
divided by the calibration results after correcting for the time between calibration and 
measurement to give the detector efficiency.  The uncertainty was obtained by dividing the 
uncertainty in the measured net counts per second of the peaks by the expected counts per 
second.  This process was performed for both detectors used.  Table B.1 shows the energy 
of the peaks identified, the corresponding isotopes, the expected number of counts per 
second based on the time between certification and when the measurements were 
performed, the measured number of counts per second, and detector efficiency in %, and 
the uncertainty in the detector efficiency in % for the second detector that was used for the 
vast majority of the testing (>90% of tests).  This detector efficiency is the product of the 
geometric efficiency (how many gammas emitted by the sample end up interacting with 
the detector) and the inherent detector efficiency (the probability that an interaction 
between a gamma photon and the detector produces a signal in the detector that is amplified 
and measured).  As none of the taggant elements used in this research were used in the 
standard, both the efficiency of the detector at the desired energies, and the uncertainty in 
the efficiency were obtained by linear interpolation.   
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59.5 Am-241 1999.0 115.5 5.8 0.02 
88.0 Cd-109 219.6 12.4 5.6 0.07 
122.1 Co-57 19.4 0.9 4.8 0.50 
661.7 Cs-137 1738.8 19.5 1.1 0.01 
1173.2 Co-60 1964.6 12.7 0.6 0.01 




 Table B.2 presents the interpolated detector efficiencies of the 80.6 keV peak for 
holmium, the 69.9 keV peak for samarium, and the 344.3 keV peak for europium 152m1. 
 
Table B.2. Detector Efficiencies for Holmium, Samarium, and Europium Peaks 




Samarium 69.6 5.1 0.22 
Holmium 80.6 5.2 0.24 
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 Figure 5.1 includes multiple elements in the same diagram.  The error bars represent 
the standard deviation in the measured concentrations of the taggant element.  Figures C.1 
through C.3 show the individual elements that comprise Figure 5.1 on the same vertical 
scale. Figure C.4 shows the data for europium on a more natural scale, and is zoomed in 
compared to Figure 5.1. 
 
 




 The measurements for 100 ppb and 500 ppb holmium are not comparable to the 
rest of the measurements.  These measurements were used to determine the detector 































questionable.  The detector broke after measuring all five of the 100 ppb samples, and one 
of the 500 ppb samples.  All samples were irradiated at the same time, since counting was  
 
 




expected to take only a couple days.  When the detector broke, this introduced a delay time 
of up to a week in the case of the 4,000 ppb samples, which is responsible for the substantial 
error bars seen in Figure C.2.  As such, these data are being presented for the sake of 
completeness.   
 Figure C.3 shows europium, and the data here look far more linear than either the 































linear when zoomed in.  A strange result is that the standard deviation of the europium 
2,000 ppb samples are larger than those of the 4,000 ppb samples.  Additionally, these two  
 
 




test series each have one outlier result, which was discarded when calculating the standard 
deviation.  The reason for this is unknown, but since both outliers were the fifth of five 
samples at the same concentration, it is possible there was insufficient mixing of the 
original solutions that the samples were drawn from.  This would create a concentration 
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